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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I aim to build upon recent attempts to situate a theory of virtue within 
work on character traits by social-cognitive scientists like Walter Mischel and Yuichi 
Shoda. I begin by examining the empirical adequacy of global cognitive-affective 
processing systems (CAPS) based character traits and virtues. I contend that empirical 
research does seem to support the existence of the former and is compatible with the 
existence of the latter.  
 Next, I argue that one model of moral development that is compatible with my 
findings in the previous chapter is the communal and tradition based model of moral 
development. I go on to defend the claim that this model is also well-suited to play a 
significant role in an account of human moral development that is in keeping with my 
findings in the previous chapter. Here I specifically focus on pre-adult human moral 
development.  
 I then turn my attention to consider human moral development in adults. I argue 
that character-friendships between adult human beings are compatible with and well-
suited for CAPS based accounts of virtue that tie virtue to human flourishing. Recent 
empirical research on the impact of groups on helping behavior does not subvert the 
moral significance of character-friendships for adult moral development.  
 I conclude my thesis by considering future issues that CAPS based virtue 
theorists need to address. This discussion is undergirded by my attempt to extend CAPS 
based accounts of virtue by defending three primary theses. First, some CAPS based 
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theories of virtue are empirically adequate. Second, the communal and tradition based 
model of moral development is compatible and well-suited for such theories, particularly 
their accounts of pre-adult moral development. Third, character-friendships are 
compatible with and well-suited for adult moral development in said accounts of virtue. 
Instead of arguing for a single CAPS based account of virtue, I defend components and 
models of virtuous development that are consonant with a variety of accounts. Thus, 
while it excludes some accounts of virtue, my project is broad enough to serve as a 
framework for a number of different understandings of virtue. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary virtue ethicists aim to advance psychologically informed accounts of 
virtue and human moral development.
1
 According to some of these accounts, virtues are 
global character traits—they are character traits which contribute to an individual’s 
behavior in widely different situations—and human moral development involves the 
cultivation and enhancement of those traits. Several prominent philosophers and 
psychologists have challenged these claims.
2
 They appeal to empirical psychological 
studies that, they believe, show there are no global character traits. If this is correct, then 
there are no virtues, much less virtues that could be relevant to an accurate account of 
                                                 
1
 Part of the impetus behind this has been G.E.M. Anscombe’s famous call for philosophers to stop doing 
moral philosophy until they provide an adequate philosophy of psychology. See Anscombe’s “Modern 
Moral Philosophy” in Philosophy 33 (1958):1-19.  
 Contemporary virtue theorists distinguish between virtue ethics, virtue theory, and a theory of 
virtue. According to these theorists, virtue ethics involves the claim that virtue is the central ethical 
concept to which all other moral concepts relate. Virtue theory, in contrast, involves the claim that virtue is 
important for moral philosophy, but may or may not be the central concept of an adequate moral 
philosophy. In even greater contrast, a theory of virtue involves the claim that although virtue is a 
constitutive component of an adequate moral philosophy, it is not the central concept for an adequate 
moral philosophy. I believe these distinctions have some merit. I will not, however, use them in this thesis. 
Instead, I will accommodate them by using the phrase “account of virtue”. I take it that this phrase is broad 
enough to enable my contributions to apply to all three positions so that I do not have to side with a 
particular position. 
2
 See John Doris “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” in Nous 32 (1998):504-530; Lack of Character: 
Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Gilbert Harman 
“Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error” in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999):315-33; “The Nonexistence of Character Traits” in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000):223-226; and Maria Merritt “Virtue Ethics and 
Situationist Personality Psychology” in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2000): 365-383. 
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human moral development.
 
In other words, if the challenge from empirical psychology 
stands, then virtue theory is a non-starter.
 3
  
 A promising response to these arguments, originally formulated by Christian 
Miller, is a cognitive-affective processing system (CAPS) based account of virtues.
4
 
Building on the work of social-cognitive psychologists Walter Mischel and Yuichi 
Shoda, Miller argues that a CAPS account shows that global character traits do exist.
5
 
Others have filled out and extended Miller’s initial argument, and have proposed virtue 
theories based on a CAPS account of character traits.
6
 Even though these accounts have 
gone a long way towards providing an adequate theory of virtue, I believe they all share 
at least two significant shortcomings. 
 The first deficiency with these accounts is that they either explicitly or implicitly 
contain the claim that empirical support for the existence of global character traits entails 
empirical support for the existence of virtues. But the existence of global character traits 
does not necessarily entail the existence of virtues. It is possible that global character 
traits which are not virtues may be the only global character traits that exist. Historically 
                                                 
3
 For discussion of how many of the initial rejoinders provided by virtue ethicists missed this point, and 
therefore failed to address the crux of Doris’s and Harman’s criticism, see Jonathan Webber’s “Virtue, 
Character, and Situation” in Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2006a):193-213 and “Character, Consistency, 
and Clarification” in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 115 (2006b): 651-658. 
4
 For examples of other responses see Nafskia Athanassoulis, “A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and 
Character Traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 215-221; Michael DePaul, 
“Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices: Are There None?” Proceedings of the World Congress of 
Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999); Rachana Kamtekar, “Situationism and 
Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character,” Ethics 114 (2004): 458-491; and J. Sabini and M. Silver, 
“Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued.” Ethics 115 (2005): 535-562. 
5
 See Christian Miller “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics” in Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 365-392.  
6
 For examples see Daniel Russell’s Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009) and Nancy Snow’s Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded 
Theory (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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speaking, virtue theorists have acknowledged this. They have often maintained that 
vices, for example, are global character traits. So an adequate account of virtue requires 
more than the veracity of the claim that empirical research suggests that global traits 
exist. It at least requires the veracity of the claim that empirical research is compatible 
with the existence of virtues.  
 The second deficiency these accounts share is that they do not provide much of 
an account of human moral development, let alone one that they demonstrate is 
compatible with CAPS.
7
  For those who do provide a discussion of human moral 
development, they tend to focus nearly exclusively on human moral development within 
adults. Such a dearth of discussion about how pre-adults can or do morally develop is 
particularly troubling from a CAPS based perspective, because proponents of this 
perspective emphasize that social learning history plays a central role in the content and 
structure of character. Thus the relative silence by virtue theorists on pre-adult moral 
development is quite disquieting given the extremely formative nature of pre-adult years 
for human beings.
8
   
In this thesis, I aim to start to address these shortcomings by extending CAPS 
accounts of virtue in three ways. First, I argue for the empirical adequacy of some CAPS 
                                                 
7
 I take it that Nancy Snow provides some of the best discussions of human moral development within a 
CAPS based perspective in Virtue as Social Intelligence. Yet even her work leaves the vast majority of 
issues involved with human moral development to the side. For a similar observation, particularly 
regarding Neo-Aristotelian CAPS based accounts of virtue, see Christian Miller’s, “Character Traits, 
Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior” in Journal of Ethics and Social Psychology 5 
(2010). 
8
 I believe this claim applies to nearly all contemporary virtue theorists. To my knowledge, not one of the 
leading proponents of virtue theory has done much to elucidate the process of human moral development 
within pre-adulthood.  
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based accounts of virtue. Second, I set forth a model of human moral development that is 
compatible with and well-suited for pre-adult human moral development within such 
accounts. Third, I contend that character-friendships between adult human beings are 
compatible with and well-suited to play a significant role in adult human moral 
development from the perspective and resources of the previous model and a CAPS 
understanding of virtues. I will now briefly explain how I plan to accomplish these three 
tasks. 
 I begin my attempt to establish the empirical adequacy of some CAPS accounts 
of virtue in Chapter II by arguing that there are good empirical reasons to believe CAPS 
based character traits exist. Because the existence of character traits does not entail the 
existence of global character traits, I move on to contend that there are good empirical 
reasons to believe that global CAPS character traits exist. I then evaluate what types of 
global character traits are compatible with a number of seminal experiments in social 
psychology. I argue that the findings of these experiments are compatible with the claim 
that global CAPS based mixed traits exist.
9
 I call these character traits ‘mixed traits’ 
because even though they are morally relevant and often contribute to what many deem 
morally appropriate behavior, they consist of one or more motivations that virtue 
theorists historically have argued are morally inappropriate. It is this characteristic, I 
take it, that distinguishes global mixed traits from virtues—global mixed character traits 
                                                 
9
 I am indebted to Christian Miller for the phrase ‘mixed trait’. I will say more about the history and 
significance of this phrase in the next chapter.  
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which do not consist of morally inappropriate motivations.
10
 I go on to maintain that 
some accounts of virtue are compatible with the previously mentioned experiments. 
Here I specifically highlight accounts of virtue that hold that virtues, for whatever 
reason, are rare. I conclude chapter two by arguing that it seems conceptually and 
logically possible for human beings to develop global mixed traits into virtues. 
 Having addressed the empirical adequacy of a CAPS based account of virtue, I 
turn my attention in Chapter III to human moral development, specifically pre-adult 
moral development. Here I aim to provide one model of human moral development that 
is compatible with my claims about CAPS based accounts of virtue and also has the 
resources to address pre-adult moral development in human beings. I argue that the 
communal and tradition based model of moral development meets these requirements. 
Rather than attempt to vindicate this model against competing models, I only contend 
that it is a model, perhaps one of many, that is compatible with empirically adequate 
CAPS based accounts of virtue.   
 In Chapter IV I move on to consider human moral development in adults. Here I 
attempt to identify a vehicle of adult human moral development that is compatible with 
my conclusions about CAPS based accounts of virtue and the communal and tradition 
based model of human moral development. I start by contending that adult character-
friendships meet these criteria. I then proceed to argue that character-friendships are 
well-suited to play a significant role in adult human moral development within CAPS 
                                                 
10
 I realize that this claim is not consistent with every historical or contemporary account of virtue. I 
address this issue in the next chapter.  
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based accounts of virtue that tie virtue to human flourishing. I conclude this chapter by 
maintaining that recent empirical research on the impact of groups on moral issues such 
as human helping behavior supports rather than subverts the importance of character-
friendships in adult moral development. 
 I conclude in Chapter V by considering a number of issues that virtue theorists 
who subscribe to CAPS based accounts of virtue need to address. In the end, I hope to 
provide a framework for CAPS based accounts of virtue that contemporary virtue 
theorists can utilize to begin to address these issues and in so doing construct an 
adequate account of virtue. In light of this goal, I have intentionally chosen not to make 
claims regarding the necessity or sufficiency of the community and tradition based 
model of human moral development or the role of character-friendships in adult moral 
development. Nor for that matter do I make such claims about the rareness of the virtues 
or the view that virtues are tied to human flourishing. I have done this with the hope of 
presenting a view compatible with a number of rival accounts of virtue.  
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CHAPTER II 
CAPS, MIXED TRAITS, AND VIRTUE 
 
Since the publication of John Doris’s 1998 essay “Persons, Situations, and Virtue 
Ethics”, several prominent philosophers and psychologists have challenged the empirical 
adequacy of accounts of virtue and models of human moral development which 
incorporate such accounts.
11
 While I acknowledge that some accounts of virtue are 
empirically adequate, I do not believe that all of them are.  
 In this chapter, I will examine and argue for the empirical adequacy of some 
accounts of virtue that are based on a CAPS based account of character traits. In doing 
so, I will defend the following theses. First, there are good empirical reasons to believe 
CAPS based character traits exist. Second, there are good empirical reasons to believe 
that global CAPS character traits exist. Third, a number of social psychological 
experiments are compatible with the claim that global CAPS based mixed character 
traits—character traits which consist of at least one motivation that virtue theorists 
historically have argued are not compatible with the motivations that are constitutive of 
virtues—exist. Fourth, these same experiments are compatible with some CAPS based 
accounts of virtues. Here I specifically highlight accounts of virtue that hold that virtues 
are rare. Fifth, it appears conceptually and logically possible for human beings to 
develop mixed traits into virtues.   
                                                 
11
 See John Doris “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics” in Nous 32 (1998):504-530. See footnote one in 
chapter one for a comprehensive list of those who agree with Doris.   
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CAPS: An Outline  
In order to defend my claim that there are good empirical reasons to believe that global 
CAPS character traits exist, I will begin by providing an outline of the salient features of 
CAPS accounts of character traits. These accounts derive from social-cognitive research 
on human personalities.
12
 Social-cognitivists acknowledge that the underlying 
assumption behind the methods and conclusions of this research is that human beings are 
interpretive creatures. Because of this, social-cognitivists argue that attempts to 
understand and explain human behavior must take into consideration the meanings that 
situations and behaviors have for the individuals under evaluation. Furthermore, social-
cognitivists contend that human personalities and interpretative patterns are the result of 
the complex interaction of numerous cognitive and affective processes.
13
 According to 
Mischel and Shoda, the best way to conceptualize and evaluate these interactions is as a 
cognitive-affective processing system, or CAPS.
14
   
   Mischel and Shoda hold that the social-cognitive units of CAPS—its 
variables—consist of beliefs, desires, expectations, feelings, goals, self-regulatory plans, 
and values. They also hold that external and internal stimuli activate these social-
                                                 
12
 In the following presentation of CAPS, I borrow some of the structure of Snow’s presentation of CAPS 
in Virtue as Social Intelligence. See especially pages 19-34. 
13
 For in-depth  discussions of these claims see W. Mischel, “Toward a Cognitive Social Learning 
Reconceptualization of Personality” in Psychology Review 80 (1973):252- 283; W. Mischel and Y. Shoda, 
“A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, 
Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure” in Psychological Review 102 (1995):246-268, and 
“Toward a Unified, Intra-Individual Dynamic Conception of Personality” in Journal of Research in 
Personality 30 (1996):414-428, and D. Cervone and Y. Shoda, The Coherence of Personality: Social-
Cognitive Bases of Consistency, Variability, and Organization (New York: Guilford, 1999). 
14
 This is, of course, a strong break from Mischel’s early work, in which he provides the ground work for 
psychological and philosophical situationism. See Mischel’s Personality and Assessment (New York: 
Wiley, 1968).  
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cognitive units.
15
 Because the claim about external stimuli is not contested, I will only 
provide examples of activations in response to internal stimuli.  
 CAPS proponents typically refer to imaginings and practical reason as token 
examples of internal stimuli. With respect to the former, I take it that imaginings can 
include states such as daydreaming and attempts to conjecture about one’s health at a 
future age. For example, Natasha may experience a rush of anxiety as she day dreams 
about being the star of her new high school’s basketball team, because she begins to 
entertain the possibility that the talents of the other incoming freshmen could jeopardize 
her long held goal to be the star player. Even though Natasha has never watched any of 
the incoming freshmen play, and has not heard reports that any of them are exceptional 
basketball players, she still cannot easily shake off her feelings of anxiety. She decides 
to address her anxiety by practicing her dribbling and shooting techniques.  A CAPS 
proponent would contend that Natasha’s anxiety is a product of internal stimuli. Her 
daydreaming produces her belief that others may impede her from being the star player. 
This belief interacts with Natasha’s long held desire and goal to be the star player, and 
produces her feeling of anxiety. The interaction of these social-cognitive units directly 
contributes to Natasha’s decision to practice basketball techniques.16 
 Similarly, while conjecturing about his state of health twenty or thirty years in 
the future, Jim begins to fear that his current lack of exercise and poor diet may lead to 
                                                 
15
 When social-cognitivists use the term activate, I understand them to mean something analogous to 
‘cause’ or ‘produce’.  
16
 I do not say produces here because that would fail to account for the role that Natasha’s practical 
reasoning plays. I discuss that role below. 
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heart disease. He quickly thinks about the yearly number of deaths that are caused by 
heart disease. Fearing that his current lifestyle may keep him from living twenty to thirty 
more years, Jim recommits to the goal of rigorous exercise three times a week. Thus the 
interaction of Jim’s belief that rigorous exercise will help to diminish the likelihood of 
him dying from heart disease with his goal not to die prematurely generates his 
recommitment to exercising. Internal stimuli, argue CAPS proponents, produces this 
interaction. 
 The previous examples also highlight how practical reasoning can serve as 
internal stimuli that activate the social-cognitive units of one’s CAPS. In the former 
case, Natasha’s decision to practice basketball techniques is partially the product of her 
practical reasoning skills responding to her belief that incoming freshmen may impede 
her goal of being the star of the high school basketball team. That is to say, although 
daydreaming activates her belief about the possible threat to her basketball goal, her 
practical reasoning activates her belief that practicing basketball techniques now will 
abate this possible threat. As she considers her goal and what acts will help her attain it, 
she activates the specific belief that she should practice a certain set of basketball 
techniques now, a belief which she did not have before or during her daydreaming 
episode. Likewise, Jim’s decision to recommit to rigorous exercise is a product of the 
complex interaction of beliefs and goals that his practical reasoning activates. After 
thinking about his future health, he engages in practical reasoning to determine how best 
to mitigate his fear and avoid the possibility of dying from heart disease. This activates 
his belief that he should recommit to the goal of exercising three times a week. Note that 
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his decision does not include the alteration of his diet. I have included this absence to 
highlight that people often do focus on one aspect of a belief or goal that causes them to 
engage in practical reasoning.
17
 Jim does identify his poor diet as a possible cause of 
heart disease. However, this belief does not continue to influence him by playing a role 
in his practical reasoning.
18
 Before I propose any CAPS based explanations for why this 
may have happened, I need to introduce three other features of a CAPS account of 
character traits.  
 Recall that social-cognitivists believe people always interpret the stimuli to 
which they respond. According to Mischel and Shoda, pre-existing personality variables 
such as temperament and social learning history influence how people interpret stimuli. 
Some people, for example, are temperamentally disposed to feel threatened. Therefore, 
these people are prone to interpret stimuli through the category of threatening. This 
influences their reactions to external stimuli, perhaps keeping them within a certain 
domain of action. Typically it reinforces their natural disposition as well.  
 Suppose that Harry, for example, is temperamentally disposed to feel threatened. 
Furthermore, suppose that one way Harry manifests this disposition is by feeling fear 
when he hears people speak loudly; whenever Harry hears loud voices, he feels fear and 
believes that he may be in danger. In other words, Harry’s temperamentally laden 
interpretation of the external stimuli of loud voices activates his feeling of fear and belief 
                                                 
17 I do not here mean to suggest that once Jim comes to a decision via his practical reasoning that his 
practical reasoning will no longer play a role in his immediate decision making. There often is a feedback 
loop between the result of one’s practical reasoning and further instances of practical reasoning. 
18
 For a discussion of the role of CAPS in dietary change and maintenance see Alexander Rothman, et.al. 
“Reflective and Automatic Processes in the Initiation and Maintenance of Dietary Change” in Annals of 
Behavioral Medicine 38 (2009):S4-S17. 
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that he may be in danger.
19
 This picture becomes significantly more complex when we 
take into consideration the influence of Harry’s social learning history on his natural 
temperament.
20
 The relationship between these two entities is that of a feedback loop. 
Harry’s natural temperament contributes to him interpreting the stimuli of loud voices 
through the category of threatening. When threatening things do correlate with loud 
voices (perhaps Harry is excoriated or physically attacked) Harry’s natural temperament 
and aversion to loud voices is reinforced. Thus there is a feedback loop between Harry’s 
temperament and social learning history.  
 This does not mean, however, that the feedback loop is deterministic. Indeed, 
CAPS proponents present the feedback loop in probabilistic terms. Where noises 
consistently produce undesirable events, Harry is more likely to respond with fear to 
new noises. Where they do not, he is less likely. In other words, if Harry encounters 
numerous instances when the activation of his fear and belief about being threatened 
prove to be unwarranted because nothing undesirable happens, then his temperament, 
method of interpretation, and activation of the former feeling and belief may 
significantly subside. Thus one is only warranted in speaking and thinking 
probabilistically about the influence of temperaments and their reinforcement in an 
individual’s social learning history. 
                                                 
19
 The exact chronological order of these does not matter for the purposes of this example. 
20
As I understand it, there are at least three ways a temperament can be natural. A temperament may be 
caused by genetic factors, prenatal developmental factors, or a combination of the previous two factors. I 
take it that all three ways are plausible, and that particular temperaments may be rightly attributed to any 
of them. 
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 The reinforcement of Harry’s temperament does point to another feature of 
CAPS based accounts of character traits. CAPS theorists maintain that the repeated 
activation of a specific set of social-cognitive units to a specific set of stimuli can build a 
rather stable personality or character trait. The consistent and repeated interpretation of a 
set of stimuli leading to the repeated activation of a set of beliefs, self-regulatory plans, 
desires, and goals can forge a stable and reliable trait. In Harry’s case, his temperaments, 
feelings of fear, and beliefs that he may be in danger all could contribute to a stable and 
reliable trait such as timidity.  
 This brings us to the third feature of CAPS based accounts of character traits that 
I want to highlight. CAPS based theorists draw a distinction between the structure of 
character traits and the dynamics of trait interaction.
21
 Mischel and Shoda contend that 
traits are specific sets of social-cognitive units that have been regularly activated in 
response to internal or external stimuli. The social-cognitive units that make up a trait 
are interconnected in the sense that the activation of one can activate the others. I 
emphasize the word ‘can’ because Mischel and Shoda also argue that the activation of 
some social-cognitive units can impede the activation of others. For example, seeing a 
homeless man on the street may activate my belief that I should give money to people in 
need. This belief may activate my belief that one is not necessarily helping another if 
one provides the financial means for that person to continue to harm themselves. Perhaps 
that belief activates my desire not to give money to people who would use it to harm 
themselves. The activation of the previous belief and desire may well keep me from 
                                                 
21
 I am indebted to Nancy Snow for this formulation. See Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 20. 
  
 
14 
 
giving the homeless man money and thus impede the activation of plans that would have 
been in keeping with my initial belief. 
 We are now ready to reconsider why Jim may not have committed to altering his 
diet. Perhaps Jim has developed a stable trait that consists of (1) the belief that he could 
die from heart disease; (2) the belief that exercise is a way to abate the threat of dying 
from heart disease; (3) the desire to exercise to avoid dying from heart disease; (4) 
specific exercise goals; (5) self-regulation plans that help him achieve the latter goals; 
and (6) the feeling of confidence. The structure of this trait allows for the possibility that 
Jim never thinks much about dietary changes. The activation of his first belief could 
easily lead to the activation of the other social-cognitive units that make up the rest of 
the trait without activating the belief that he should change his diet.  
 To this point, I have considered five features of the CAPS account: the 
assumption that human beings are interpretive creatures; the claim that the interpretation 
of external and internal stimuli activates social-cognitive units; the belief that pre-
existing personality variables influence how people interpret stimuli; the claim that 
repeated activation of a specific set of social-cognitive units to specific set of stimuli 
builds a rather stable character trait; and the distinction between the structure of 
character traits and the dynamics of trait interaction. With accounts of two final features, 
we will be in a position to discuss the empirical adequacy of global CAPS character 
traits. These features involve the generalizability of CAPS. Because of the nature of 
character traits, Mischel and Shoda argue that traits can be described in terms of 
“if….then” behavioral signatures. Behavioral signatures describe the relationship 
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between a person’s behavior and their construal of stimuli, especially external stimuli, 
over time.
22
 Thus the “ifs” do not only refer to the objective stimuli in a situation, but 
also to the meaning or interpretation a person typically gives to those stimuli. Nancy 
Snow summarizes the point well when she says that given a substantial amount of 
evidence “of consistent behavioral reactions under certain psychological conditions, we 
can typically predict behavior and attribute traits.”23  For example, we could make the 
following conditional statement about Harry: “If Harry perceives that he is being 
threatened, he will typically be timid.”24 
 The second aspect I wish to note is that CAPS character traits can be 
generalizable over a wide range of objectively different situations. This is because the 
meanings or interpretations individuals give to objectively different situations can, over 
time, build up and activate the same trait and trait-based response. The components of 
Harry’s timidity may activate because he perceives the tone of his wife as being 
threatening. Similarly, the same trait can activate because Harry perceives the glance his 
boss gives him as being threatening. In both situations the trait can be the same, because 
                                                 
22
 The amount of time varies. In one experiment, Mischel and his colleagues composed behavioral 
signatures for eighty-four children after six weeks of observing them at a summer camp. See Y. Shoda, W. 
Mischel, and J.C. Wright, “Intraindividual Stability in the Organization and Patterning of Behavior: 
Incorporating Psychological Situations in the Idiographic Analysis of Personality” in Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 67 (1994):674-687.  
23
 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 21. 
24
 Note that this formulation captures the probabilistic nature of CAPS that I highlighted in my discussion 
of the feedback loop between social history and trait reinforcement. 
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repeated encounters with stimuli that Harry perceives as being threatening have built up 
the stable trait structure of timidity.
25
 
 
Global CAPS Character Traits: A Brief Defense 
We are now in a position to consider the empirical adequacy of the claims that CAPS 
character traits and global CAPS character traits exist. So far my examples have only 
served to help elucidate the conceptual issues involved with CAPS accounts of character 
traits. From these examples it obviously does not follow that CAPS accounts of 
character traits, global or otherwise, are empirically adequate. Before we consider any 
experimental findings, we should note that CAPS can be global traits. This follows from 
the fact that human beings can cultivate CAPS so that they are generalizable over a wide 
range of objectively different situations.
26
 This, of course, does not mean that they have 
to or as a matter of contingent fact always do become so generalized. Let us now turn 
our attention to consider whether any empirical findings in social psychology support the 
empirical adequacy of the claims that CAPS character traits and global CAPS character 
traits exist.  
 One of the significant studies Shoda, Mischel, and their colleague Wright 
performed to verify their account of CAPS took place at a children’s summer camp in 
                                                 
25
 For similar arguments see Miller, “Social Psychology,” 382-389, Russell, Practical Intelligence, 323-
331 , and Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 31-34.  
26
 See my discussion of the fourth and fifth features of CAPS character traits for a presentation and 
defense of this claim. 
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New Hampshire.
27
 Over the course of six weeks, researchers observed eighty-four 
children participate in objective situations such as woodworking sessions, and five 
different interpersonal situations—(1) positive contact between peers; (2) teasing, 
provocation, or threatening between peers; (3) praising by adults; (4) warning by adults; 
(5) and punishing by adults—that occurred in the objective settings. The observers 
focused on the interpersonal situations, which the researchers chose based on previous 
interviews they had held with the children that enabled them to gain an understanding of 
the types of interpersonal situations that were important for the children at the camp. We 
should note that, “[e]ach of the interpersonal situations incorporated a different 
combination of two psychologically salient features: whether the interpersonal 
interaction was initiated by a peer of the subject or by an adult counselor, and whether 
the interaction was valenced positive or negative.”28 Table 1 below shows examples of 
how observers recorded these features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 For the complete details of this study, see Y. Shoda, W. Mishel, and J.C. Wright, “Intraindividual 
Stability”, 674-687. At times I will borrow from the structure of Nancy Snows presentation of this study. 
For her presentation, see Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 21-25. 
28
 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 21-22. 
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Table 1: Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 
Objective Situation Interpersonal Situations Psychological Situations 
E.g. Woodworking 
 
(1) When peer initiated positive contact 
(2) When peer teased, provoked, or threatened 
(3) When adult praised 
(4) When adult warned 
(5)When adult punished 
Peer, positive 
Peer, negative 
Adult, positive 
Adult, negative 
Adult, negative 
Source: Shoda, Mischel, and Wright 1994, Table 1, 676. 
 
 
 
Throughout the study, subjects experienced each of the five interpersonal situations at a 
minimum of six times. Additionally, during each hour of camp events, observers 
recorded the frequency of five forms of behavior that subjects demonstrated in the five 
interpersonal situations: (1) verbal aggression; (2) physical aggression; (3) whined or 
displayed babyish behavior; (4) complied or gave in; and (5) talked prosocially.
29
 
 Within this setup, Shoda, Mischel, and Wright tested two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that subjects would exhibit stable situation-behavior profiles that are 
unique to each subject and illuminate each subject’s personality. For example, if child 
#11 is teased by a peer, he may consistently react with physical aggression, regardless of 
the situation. If child #19, on the other hand, is teased by a peer, he may consistently 
react with verbal aggression, regardless of the situation. In other words, “researchers 
                                                 
29
 I am indebted to Snow for this succinct formulation of the five behaviors the observers looked for 
during the study. Also, ‘prosocially’ refers to conversations in which children expressed a concern for the 
needs of others apart from what may have benefited them. 
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hypothesized that consistent reactions to different interpersonal situations give insight 
into an individual’s personality.”30 
 The second hypothesis the researchers tested is that meaning across-situational 
behavioral consistency is undergirded by the similarity in meaning that different 
situations have for human beings. For example, if child #3 reacts with physical 
aggression to being teased by his peers, regardless of what objective situation, his 
behavioral consistency in these different situations is undergirded by the meaning that 
the interpersonal situation of a peer teasing him has for him.  
 The researchers’ findings supported both of the hypotheses. With respect to the 
first, each child had a unique situation-behavior profile. For example, although a number 
of children had unique and relatively stable profiles for verbal aggression, child #17’s 
was the most stable. According to Shoda, Mischel, and Wright, situation-behavior 
profiles “[t]ended to constitute a predictable nonrandom facet of individual 
differences.”31 In other words, the stable tendencies the observers recorded highlight the 
uniqueness of each subject’s personality and character. 
 As for the second hypothesis, that cross-situational behavioral consistency is 
undergirded by the similarity in meaning that different situations have for human beings, 
researchers found that the likelihood of particular responses to a similar interpersonal 
situations in a wide range of situations was greater than the likelihood of its occurrence 
across different types of interpersonal situations. Furthermore, as Snow observers, 
                                                 
30
 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 22. 
31
 Shoda, Mischel, and Wright, “Intraindividual Stability”, 682. 
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additional “[s]upport for this claim is provided by the researchers’ finding that as the 
number of shared psychological features of interpersonal situations decreased, the 
consistency of individual differences in behavior also decreased.”32 
 The findings of this experiment suggest that CAPS based character traits exist. 
Furthermore, the findings also support the claim that there are good reasons to believe 
that global CAPS based character traits exist. The fact that the children had distinct, 
stable behavioral profiles across a wide range of situations is in step with the notion of a 
global character trait. Let us now turn to another experiment to consider whether it 
supports the two claims in question.  
 A group of researchers performed a study to better understand why white males 
in rural and small suburban areas in the southern states of the USA are twice as likely to 
commit a homicide as a result of an argument than their northern counterparts.
33
 The 
researchers tested the hypothesis that these results are due to a culture of honor that 
exists in the southern states, but not the northern states. They took a sample of all white 
male citizens of the USA studying at the University of Michigan and divided them into 
two groups, southerners (someone who lived in a southern state for at least six years) 
and northerners (someone who had lived in a southern state for less than six years, 
including none at all). The average southerner had lived eighty percent of his life in a 
southern state, whereas the average northerner had only lived five percent of his life in a 
southern state. The researchers concluded before the study that evidence for the 
                                                 
32
 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 24. 
33
 See Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South 
(Oxford and Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). 
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hypothesis would correspond to the existence of signs that southerners were significantly 
more likely to react violently to insults than northerners.  
 The format of the experiment was quite simple. Each subject would complete a 
questionnaire, deliver it to a room at the other side of a long corridor, and return to the 
initial room. Some subjects passed an individual in the corridor who had to close a filing 
cabinet to let them pass on the way down and back. The person closing the cabinet 
would use their shoulder to bump the subject as they passed. The person would then 
mutter an insult. Subjects who served as the control for the experiment walked down an 
empty corridor. The experiment consisted of three further variations. In one variation, 
the subjects had to complete a story, which involved Jill telling her fiancé Steve that a 
mutual friend Larry, who knew they were engaged, had been attempting to make moves 
on her, and only stopped when he thought Steve saw him trying to kiss Jill. Seventy-five 
percent of insulted southerners completed the story with Steve harming or threatening to 
harm Larry, whereas only twenty percent of control southerners did so. Whether or not 
northerners had been insulted made no statistically relevant difference to the way 
northerners completed the story. 
 In the second variation, subjects took saliva tests both before they completed 
their questionnaire and after they returned from delivering it at the other end of the 
corridor. Researchers measured the differences in two hormones: cortisol, which 
associates with high levels of anxiety; and testosterone, which associates with 
aggression. In southerners who were insulted, cortisol levels rose by an average of 
seventy-nine percent, whereas in control southerners, it only rose by an average of forty-
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two percent. In northerners who were insulted, cortisol levels only rose by an average of 
thirty-three percent, whereas in control northerners, it rose to an average of thirty-nine 
percent. The researchers observed similar results in testosterone levels. In southerners 
who were insulted, testosterone levels rose twelve percent, whereas they only rose four 
percent in control southerners. In insulted northerners, testosterone levels rose six 
percent, whereas in control northerners it only rose four percent. Thus there clearly is a 
significantly greater average increase in the two hormone levels for insulted southerners 
than for either northern group. 
 In the third variation, the subjects returning from the end of the corridor 
encountered someone coming from the other direction: a large college football player. 
Every subject gave the football player space to pass. Yet the amount of room that they 
gave varied. Insulted southerners provided an average of three feet of space, whereas 
control southerners gave about nine feet. Insulted northerners provided an average of six 
feet of space, whereas control northerners gave five and half feet. Thus the impacts of 
insults on southerners were significantly greater than insults on northerners. 
 The findings of this experiment once again provide good reasons to believe that 
CAPS based character traits and global CAPS based character traits exist. The likelihood 
that an individual would manifest a more aggressive or violent behavior or substantial 
physiological response strongly correlated with the geographical location in which the 
person had lived most of his life.
34
  In other words, the claim that many southerners have 
                                                 
34
 Numerous other studies have confirmed the existence of such geographically influenced traits. We will 
consider two such cases in the next section. 
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a character trait to act aggressively and violently to insults has the explanatory and 
predictive power to account for the results.  Because many male southerners have an 
interpretive framework and set of beliefs, feelings, and goals that activate when they 
construe a situation as an instance where someone insults them, they are likely to act in 
an aggressive or violent manner when they construe that someone has insulted them. 
While I recognize that the cross-situational nature of this experiment is far more limited 
than that of Shoda, Mischel, and Wright, I think that when one considers it in light of the 
fact that southern whites from rural or small suburban towns are twice as likely to 
commit a homicide as a result of an argument than their northern counterparts, one has 
good reasons to believe that global CAPS based character traits exist. Many male 
southerners have a global character trait that helps to produce aggressive and violent 
behavior across a wide range of situations. So long as they perceive that someone has 
insulted them, the global character trait involved with this behavior will activate. The 
activation of this trait is likely to cause a strong physiologically and psychologically 
response in the southern male. 
 
CAPS, Mixed Traits, and Virtues: A Taxonomy and Defense 
Thus far I have presented the salient features of a CAPS account of character traits and 
have argued that two experiments support the claims that CAPS character traits and 
global CAPS character traits exist. Given that virtues are by definition global character 
traits, it seems at the very least plausible that virtues are a subset of CAPS. In other 
words, because on this view all character traits are a form of CAPS character traits, 
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virtues are by definition a subset of CAPS character traits. Of course, it does not follow 
from this that all CAPS character traits are virtues. Virtue theorists readily acknowledge 
this. They maintain that vicious character traits, e.g. self-centeredness and pride, and 
non-vicious character traits, e.g. promptness and tidiness, do exist.
35
 Furthermore, virtue 
theorists also acknowledge that these character traits can be global in nature. I may, for 
example, demonstrate the character trait of tidiness over a wide range of locations and 
situations. Although a global nature is not a logical requirement that non-virtue character 
traits must meet to be a subset of CAPS character traits, I believe that we should 
recognize this so that we do not hold that virtues are conceptually distinct from other 
character traits because they and they alone are global in nature. 
 To understand why the latter point is significant, let us consider an important 
question that arises when we acknowledge the existence of CAPS character traits that are 
not virtues: What distinguishes a virtue from other character traits?  We clearly cannot 
answer this question by asserting that virtues are global character traits, whereas non-
virtue character traits are not. Although being global is a necessary condition for a 
virtue, it is not a sufficient condition. Again, most virtue theorists would not argue that 
my global character trait of tidiness is a virtue. Thus not only does this definition fail, 
but its failure demonstrates that the existence of global character traits does not 
necessarily secure the existence of virtues.   
                                                 
35
 For examples of how virtue theorists distinguish between virtues and other character traits see Julia 
Annas’s Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and Robert M. Adams’s A Theory of 
Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). I will say more about this below. 
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 Historically speaking, many virtue theorists have willingly conceded this fact, 
and have gone on to provide definitions of virtue that incorporate additional necessary 
conditions. I believe we can summarize a number of these definitions with the following 
working definition: virtues are globally efficacious dispositions to do a good or right 
action in a specific situation for good or morally appropriate motivations.
36
 We should 
note several components of this definition.  
First, the phrase ‘globally efficacious’ highlights the cross-situational, global, 
nature of virtues. If I have the global character trait of courage, then I will typically act 
in a courageous way when I am in objectively different situations where courage is 
morally appropriate. Second, the term disposition serves as a stand in for the term 
character traits; character traits simply are dispositions that consist of social-cognitive 
units like beliefs, feelings, and goals.
 37
  As such, these mental entities play a causal role 
in the behavior of the agent who possesses them. Recall timid Harry. Because Harry 
possesses the globally efficacious character trait of timidity, he has a disposition to act 
timidly when he perceives that a situation is threatening. Third, virtues are distinct from 
non-virtue character traits like timidity, which typically does not contribute to good or 
right action, because they typically cause one to act well or in accordance with right 
                                                 
36
 I admit that this formulation does not account for all of the historically significant definitions of virtue. 
Because of this, much of what proceeds will not apply to a number of important accounts of virtue (e.g. 
Adams’s (2006), Driver’s (2001), Hume’s (1740, 2007), Hurka’s (2001)). However, I take it that this 
formulation is in keeping with the important accounts of virtue championed by Aristotle (2001), Augustine 
(1953, 1955, 1971), Thomas Aquinas (1992, 2005), and Julia Annas (2011). I will address the significance 
of the diverse range of definitions of virtue later in this thesis.  
37
 Dispositional language is not new to contemporary accounts to virtue. Julia Annas points out that “all 
ancient theories understand a virtue to be, at least, a disposition…” See The Morality of Happiness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9. I take it that at least one significant difference between a 
disposition and a habit is that it is not a necessary condition of habits that they consist of goals, feels, 
beliefs, and desires whereas these are necessary conditions for a disposition that is a virtue.  
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action. Here I use the word ‘typically’ to accommodate instances where a feature of a 
situation makes it impossible for one to manifest their virtue. Let us pause to elucidate 
what I mean. 
Suppose, for example, that I have the virtues justice and compassion. Further 
suppose that I live in a death camp where I do not receive adequate nutrition, and 
therefore am emaciated, and I frequently witness the brutal and gratuitous execution of 
multitudes every day. As I witness a guard prepare to drag and execute a young child, I 
may interpret the situation in such a way that both my virtues of justice and compassion 
move me. These virtues activate my desire to stop the guard from killing the child. Yet 
my emaciated state and lack of weapons keep me from acting on these virtues. I can only 
turn away as I hear the echoes of the guard’s discharged gun. This example elucidates 
the type of features that virtue theorists believe make it truly impossible for a virtuous 
person to act in accordance with their virtue. Simply experiencing a minor impediment, 
such as being in a poor mood, does not qualify as something that makes the 
manifestation of a virtue impossible. 
The fourth component of the definition of virtue I have provided that we should 
consider is the phrase ‘specific situation’. Virtue theorists incorporate this to emphasize 
the non-abstract nature of the actions that virtues cause. That is to say, they believe 
virtues are traits that help one act well given the specifics of their situation. They believe 
this focus on the particulars of concrete situations is a strength that their moral theory 
has over those which stress abstract moral reasoning that involves the application of 
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abstract moral principles. Indeed, this feature is one reason why virtue theorists have 
historically emphasized the importance of the virtue of practical wisdom. 
The final component we need to consider is the phrase ‘for good or morally 
appropriate motivations.’ Virtue theorists use this to draw attention to the importance of 
the motives that cause one to perform a particular act. In order for an action to have its 
origin in a virtue, virtue theorists argue, the proper motives must produce said action. 
Furthermore, I take it that virtue theorists who would subscribe to my definition of virtue 
would deny that any action proceeded from a virtue if an improper motivation played a 
causal role in its production. For example, these virtue theorists would contend that even 
if part of the motivation for my successful attempt to rescue Bill Gates from a collision 
with an oncoming car was that I thought it would cause him to give me a large amount 
of money, then I did not manifest a virtue like courage, bravery, or compassion.  
With our working definition of a virtue in hand, we may now return to our 
consideration of the relationship between CAPS character traits and virtues. From what 
we have said thus far, even though there are good reasons to believe that global CAPS 
character traits exist, it still does not follow that virtues, as I have described them, exist. 
Given the empirical and predictive nature of our working definition of virtue, I believe 
we must once again turn to empirical psychology to ascertain whether or not virtues 
exist. Although an exhaustive or comprehensive presentation of the relevant findings is 
beyond the scope of this paper, I believe that a brief consideration of some of the most 
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germane experiments will allow us to get a good sense of the common trends in the 
findings. Thus let us turn to consider four of the relevant experiments.
38
 
Some of the most seminal experiments in social psychology are the so-called 
Milgram experiments.
39
 In order to better understand how ordinary human beings could 
participate in atrocities like the Holocaust, Stanley Milgram set up an experiment 
designed to illuminate how human beings respond to authority. Subjects in the 
experiment received a slip of paper which informed them that they were to serve as 
‘teachers’ in a scientific experiment on memory. The subjects sat in a room with a 
monitor and electric dial. In addition to marks which designated 15 volt intervals from 
15 volts to 450 volts, the dial also had eight labels: “Slight Shock”, “Moderate Shock”, 
“Strong Shock”, “Very Strong Shock”, “Intense Shock”, “Extreme Intensity Shock”, 
“Danger: Sever Shock”, and “XXX”. In a room adjacent to the subject’s sat the subject’s 
students, also known as learners. The subjects would ask the learners questions that 
supposedly tested their memory. If the learner answered a question correctly, nothing 
happened to them. If, however, they answered a question incorrectly, the subjects had to 
turn the electric dial and administer a shock to the learner. Throughout the experiment a 
person in a white coat observed and at times encouraged the subject to administer the 
shock when the learner failed to answer a question correctly. This was, the person 
reminded, their responsibility as ‘teachers’.  
                                                 
38
 I will only provide examples from experiments concerned with obedience to authority and helping traits 
such as compassion and empathy. Part of the motivation behind this decision is that much of the relevant 
literature deals with precisely these three traits.  
39
 See Stanley Milgram “Behavioral Study of Obedience” in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 
67 (1963):371-378; and Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).  
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Unbeknownst to the subjects, the learners actually were actors, and the dial never 
actually released an electric shock. Yet every time a learner incorrectly answered a 
question, the subject believed they truly administered a shock to the learner. The learners 
further encouraged this belief by moaning, screaming, and begging the experimenters to 
cease the experiment at the higher levels, because they could not handle the pain from 
the electric shocks.  The learners increased the intensity of their sounds as the power of 
the shock supposedly increased. If the subject questioned whether it was appropriate to 
continue the experiment, the person in the white coat would encourage them to 
proceed.
40
 At the conclusion of the experiment, 65% of the subjects had continued the 
experiment to the 450 volt limit labeled “XXX”.  That said, we should note an important 
observation that Milgram made in a famous passage about one of the subjects. 
According to Milgram, “I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the 
laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, 
stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse.”41 Even 
though this businessman did continue the experiment to the 450 volt limit, he manifested 
a number of significant physiological and psychological effects that suggest that he did 
not at all approve of his behavior. 
                                                 
40
 The observer had a list of four responses to make when a subject voiced their concern about the 
experiment: (1) “Please continue” or “Please go on”, (2) “The experiment requires that you continue”, (3) 
“It is absolutely essential that you continue”, and (4) “You have no other choice, you must go on.” The 
observer was only allowed to make these responses in sequence. If the subject continued to express 
concern after the fourth response, the subject was excused from the experiment.  
41
 Milgram, “Behavioral Study”, 377. 
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Since Milgram published his findings, social psychologists have carried out a 
number of similar experiments.
42
 For example, David M. Mantell found that Germans 
were considerably more obedient than Milgram’s American subjects. Whereas 65% of  
American subjects continued the experiment to 450 volts, 85 % of Mantell’s German 
subjects continued the experiment to 450 volts.
43
 In an experiment with Australians, 
Kilham and Mann found significantly different results. Only 28% of their subjects 
continued the experiment to 450 volts.
44
 Before I discuss the possible significance of 
these findings for accounts of virtue, let us turn to consider three other relevant 
experiments. I will cover the features of these experiments in less detail. 
 To better understand the influence of pleasant smells on human helping 
behavior, Robert Baron conducted an experiment in which he compared people’s 
helping behavior in front of clothing stores and restaurants specializing in sweet baked 
goods.
45
 Baron observed that 12.5% to 25% of subjects demonstrated helping behavior 
near the clothing stores, the control locations of the experiment. In contrast, 45% to 61% 
of subjects demonstrated helping behavior when they had just passed by restaurants like 
                                                 
42
 As Jonathan Webber notes, “This experiment was repeated with thousands of subjects in various 
countries across three decades…” See Webber, “Virtue, Character, and Situation” in Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 3 (2006a):196. 
43
 David Mantell, “The Potential for Violence in Germany” in Journal of Social Issues 27 (1971):101-112. 
44
 W. Kilham and L. Mann, “Level of Destructive Obedience as a Junction of Transmitter and Executant 
Roles in the Milgram Obedience Paradigm” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29 (1974): 
696-702. 
45
 Robert Baron, “The Sweet Smell of…Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial 
Behavior in Shopping Malls” in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23 (1997): 498-503. 
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Cinnabon and Mrs. Field’s Cookies. According to Baron, subjects acknowledged that the 
pleasant fragrances of the restaurants had put them in a relatively good mood.
46
  
In another experiment on helping traits, Latane and Darley designed situations 
meant to test the impact that groups and group settings have on human helping behavior. 
They arranged for subjects in a variety of types of groups to encounter a man 
experiencing what appeared like an epileptic seizure. They found that strangers in a 
group responded significantly slower to a perceived epileptic fit than friends in a 
group.
47
 Additionally, they observed that subjects in a group helped at the same rate and 
speed as subjects who were alone if the subjects in the group had some prior interaction 
with a victim of a seizure.
48
 
The final experimental findings we will consider come from a study performed 
by Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini. Researchers varied the mood of some subjects by 
asking them to recall and reflect upon past sad experiences. They then gave the subjects 
a drug which the subjects did not know was a placebo. The researchers told half of the 
subjects that the drug would freeze their present mood, and kept this information from 
the other half. When the subjects began to leave the experiment, other researchers 
provided them with an opportunity to volunteer their time to make a number of calls of 
                                                 
46
 For similar results for control subjects, see Isen and Levin “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies 
and Kindness” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21(1972):384-388; and Levin and Isen 
“Further Studies on the Effect of Feeling Good on Helping” in Sociometry (1975): 38. 
47
 Latane and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? (New York: Appleton 
Century–Crofts, 1970), 105-106.  
48
 Ibid., 108-109. 
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their choosing (between 1 and 10) for a local nonprofit blood organization.
49
 The results 
are below in table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  Sad Subjects       Controls 
Labile Mood    58% volunteered, mean of 3.25 calls    33% volunteered, mean of 1.25  
 
Fixed Mood     42% volunteered, mean of 1.25 calls    42% volunteered, mean of 1.58 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Thus, “[S]ad subjects helped more than neutral mood controls only if they believed their 
mood was alterable. When sad subjects were led to believe that helping could not 
improve their mood, they were no more helpful than neutral mood subjects.”50 
 I believe the previous four findings reflect trends within experiments in social 
psychology that have numerous implications for the empirical adequacy of virtues. 
Consider, for example, the varied results in the different versions of the Milgram 
experiment. American subjects were considerably more likely to obey the authority 
figure in the experiment than Australian subjects. Yet American subjects were also 
considerably less likely to obey the authority figure in the experiment than German 
subjects. Although one must exercise caution when one extrapolates from a handful of 
experiments, it does seem reasonable to interpret these findings to suggest that: (1) the 
                                                 
49
 I am indebted to Christian Miller for this data table. See Miller “Character Traits, Social Psychology, 
and Impediments to Helping Behavior” in Journal of Ethics and Social Psychology 5 (2010), 12. 
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frequency and stability of traits may vary from geographical location to another
51
; (2) the 
impact that the presence and commands of an authority figure have on a person vary, 
even for people from the same geographical location; and (3) for some people the 
presence of an authority figure who tells them to continue despite their reservations 
suppresses their trait to act in accordance with compassion or empathy. I take it that of 
these three claims, (3) is the least straightforward. I now turn to defend it. 
 Recall Milgram’s description of the businessman before and after he completed 
the experiment. The physical and psychological responses of the businessman to the 
experiment and his participation in it suggest that he experienced a high level of internal 
turmoil. Elsewhere Milgram notes that many other subjects also displayed “striking 
reactions of emotional strain” during the experiment, and that upon completion of the 
experiment reported high levels of stress and nervous tension. 
52
 From the perspective of 
a CAPS account of character traits, these responses strongly suggest that some subjects 
in the experiment who turned the dial to its maximum level experienced a tension 
between at least two competing character traits: a compassion-like trait and a trait to 
obey authority figures. I say compassion-like trait instead of compassion because, if the 
subjects had the virtue of compassion, where compassion has the features of the 
definition of a virtue that I defined above, then the subjects should have manifested it by 
not turning the dial to administer a lethal amount of electricity to a person who merely 
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 I take ‘geographical locations’ to signify a broad range of locations including specific communities, 
cities, regions (e.g. states or provinces), and countries. 
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 See Milgram, Obedience, chapter 8 and chapter 12 for more on experiment 13. 
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failed to answer a question correctly in a voluntary science experiment.
53
 Yet these 
subjects did manifest features of compassion. So it seems appropriate to say that they did 
possess a compassion-like character trait that inclined them to cease their participation in 
the experiment. Moreover, they did manifest that trait in part. We see this in their 
physiological and psychological responses. However, this character trait ultimately was 
overridden by their character trait to obey authority.  
 Latane and Darley found similar results in their experiments on the impacts 
groups have on human helping behavior. According to them, “[m]any of these subjects 
[who did not help] showed signs of nervousness: they often had trembling hands and 
wreathing palms. If anything, they seemed more emotionally aroused than did the 
subjects who reported the emergency.”54 I take it that such physiological and 
psychological responses are manifestations of compassion-like traits. Yet once again, the 
failure of these subjects to act fully in accordance with the virtue of compassion requires 
that we do not claim that they manifested compassion. 
 So far I have argued that the Milgram experiments and the experiments 
performed by Latane and Darley suggest that character traits which are not quite virtues 
do exist. I believe that the other two experiments also support this claim. According to 
                                                 
53
 To my knowledge, no virtue theorist who would adhere to the definition of virtue I have provided would 
disagree with this claim. In addition, proponents of the situationist critique highlight that the causal 
significance that minor situational factors have in experiments like the four we have considered should 
alarm those who believe in the existence of virtues. For example, “both disappointing omissions and 
appalling actions are readily induced through seemingly minor situations. What makes these findings so 
striking is just how insubstantial the situational influence that produce troubling moral failures seem to be” 
(Merritt et. al, “Character” in The Moral Psychology Handbook, Ed. John Doris and the Moral Psychology 
Research Group (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 357, emphasis theirs.    
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my definition of virtue, a situational factor as trivial as the fragrance of cinnamon rolls 
and cookies should not contribute to the likelihood that human beings manifest virtues 
like compassion and empathy. Baron, however, found that these features do impact the 
likelihood that many human beings will exhibit helping behavior. Similarly, Manucia, 
Baumann, and Cialdini found that the ability to alter one’s mood significantly impacted 
whether or not some people exhibited helping behavior. In this case, it seems that 
subjects were far more likely to help other people if they believed doing so could 
contribute to a change in their mood.
55
 The causal influence of this selfish motive seems 
out of step with the notion that a virtue only consists of good or morally appropriate 
reasons and motives. Yet both of these findings, which social psychologists have 
replicated in hundreds of experiments, are compatible with the existence of a 
compassion-like character trait that consists of social-cognitive unites that are also 
constitutive components of selfishness.
56
 That is, a specific selfish desire or goal may be 
a constitutive component of one’s compassion-like trait. In addition, the extent to which 
and variety of locations in which social psychologists encounter these types of character 
traits in human beings suggests that they are quite common. 
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 A number of social psychologists believe the best model of the relationship between bad moods and 
helping behavior is the mood management hypothesis.  According to this model, if a human being has a 
bad mood, then that bad mood will contribute to a motive in that human being to terminate the mood and 
return to a psychological state of equilibrium. See M. Schaller and R. Cialdini, “Happiness, Sadness, and 
Helping: A Motivational Integration,” in Handbooks of Motivation and Cognition, Ed. E Higgins and R. 
Sorrentino (New York: The Guilford Press, 1990): 265-296; and S. Taylor, “Asymmetrical Effects of 
Positive and Negative Events: The Modilization-Minimization Hypothesis,” in Psychological Bulletin 110 
(1991): 67-85. I am indebted to Christian Miller for initially bringing this model to my attention. 
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 See Miller’s “Character Traits” for a discussion of how often social psychologists have encountered 
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 I believe the following working definition adequately captures both the nature of 
these common mixed traits and how they differ from virtues. Mixed traits are 
dispositions which may be generalized that contribute to an increased or decreased 
likelihood that one does a good or right thing. The motivations of these actions are 
mixed in that they are not completely good or morally appropriate.  
 Because of mood management mechanisms, mixed traits can either increase the 
likelihood that one performs a compassion-like act, for example, or that one refrains 
from doing so. The behavior an individual exhibits will depend upon their interpretation 
of their situation and the other beliefs, goals, and character traits that their interpretation 
activates. If they possess the goal to alleviate bad feelings through an action that they 
perceive is likely to cost them the least by way of personal difficulty, then they may not 
make a number of phone calls to a nonprofit blood organization. They may believe that 
this will take away too much of their time. Instead, they choose to drop a few coins in 
the Salvation Army Christmas container as they walk to their car. These traits are 
probabilistic, because they only contribute to the overall likelihood that one will or will 
not perform a particular action. As we have seen, the motivations are clearly mixed. Yet 
they always seem to consist of at least some good or morally appropriate motivations. 
This rules out that they are, as I have defined, vices. Finally, the experimental findings 
are compatible with the claim that these traits are global. From a CAPS based 
perspective, a global take on these traits is not only compatible with the findings, but 
helps to provide a rich explanatory and predictive component to the findings. For 
example, because global mixed traits are common in human beings, many subjects in the 
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Milgram experiment who continued the experiment to 450 volts demonstrated a number 
of compassion-like responses, e.g. suggested to stop the experiment, as they supposedly 
administered high levels of voltage to leaners. The resources of a global CAPS character 
trait framework allow us to explain and predict these behaviors. 
 
CAPS, Mixed Traits, and Virtues: A Second Defense 
Thus far I have argued for three claims: (1) there are good empirical reasons to believe 
CAPS based character traits exist; (2) there are good empirical reasons to believe that  
global CAPS character traits exist; and (3) a number of social psychological experiments 
are compatible with the claim that global CAPS based mixed traits exist. I will now 
defend my final two theses: (4) these same experiments do not show that all CAPS based 
accounts of virtues are empirically inadequate; and (5) it appears conceptually and 
logically possible for human beings to develop mixed traits into virtues. 
 The first point we need to note as we consider thesis (4) is that the empirical 
evidence is compatible with global CAPS character traits. This is important for virtues 
because they are by definition global character traits. We have seen that this alone is not 
enough to secure the existence of virtues. Nor is it enough to show that the empirical 
evidence is compatible with the existence of virtues. I take it that this would help secure 
the empirical adequacy of some accounts of virtue. If the empirical findings are 
compatible with the existence of virtues, then perhaps some accounts of virtue are 
empirically adequate. 
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 I believe we have good reason to hold that the empirical evidence is compatible 
with some accounts of virtue. In the Milgram experiments, for example, there are always 
people who refuse to harm a learner by admitting a painful or high electric shock. In 
Latane and Darley’s epileptic experiment, there were always groups of people and 
individuals within the different types of groups who helped the man who seemed to need 
immediate assistance.  Similarly, in the study Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini 
performed, some people offered to make calls for the nonprofit blood organization even 
though they had reasons to believe that it would not help them alter their mood. The 
existence of these sorts of subjects surely does not entail that virtues exist. However, the 
fact that these people are found in every relevant experiment is compatible with some 
accounts of virtue. At the very least, it is compatible with the rarity thesis championed 
by virtue theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Michael DePaul, and 
Christian Miller. By ‘rarity thesis’ I mean the theory that only a small number of people 
have the virtues, as I have defined them. The point of this theory is not to champion the 
importance of virtue because it is rare. Rather, the aforementioned virtue theorists hold it 
because they believe that it is a contingent fact about the world that few people have the 
virtues. Perhaps in a possible world this is not the case. The rarity thesis does not speak 
to that. It only consists of claims about our world. And the empirical findings in this 
world are compatible with this claim. Therefore, a CAPS based account of virtues that 
holds to the rarity thesis is compatible with the empirical evidence. From this it follows 
that at least some CAPS based accounts of virtue which consist of the rarity thesis are 
not empirically inadequate.  
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 Even if some CAPS based accounts of virtue are empirically adequate, those 
accounts need to provide a story about how human beings can acquire and cultivate the 
virtues. As Christian Miller recently noted, such a story is conspicuously absent in 
contemporary accounts.
57
 I believe one possible way virtue theorists can proceed in this 
endeavor is to hold that human beings can cultivate mixed traits into virtues. This is both 
conceptually and logically possible within a CAPS framework of character traits.  
 According to CAPS theorists, human beings can augment, eradicate, and bolster 
even stably developed character traits. This could involve, but is not limited to, the 
cultivation of a new interpretive perspective, belief, or goal. Given the ability to alter 
these components, I believe virtue theorists can reasonably argue that moral 
development from a mixed trait to a virtue will involve transforming one’s mixed trait 
into a virtue. I recognize that this will be difficult, and probably will require a significant 
amount of time. Yet given the resources of the CAPS framework and the empirical 
findings of social psychologists, I see no reason to hold that this is impossible.  
 
Conclusion 
Contrary to the claims of several prominent psychologists and philosophers, I have 
argued that virtue theory still is a live option. Within the perspective of a CAPS based 
account of character traits, virtue theorists may offer empirically adequate theories of 
human behavior. The existence of mixed traits does not keep them from this. Rather, 
they can conceptually and logically serve as a stepping stone in the process of the moral 
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development of virtues. I recognize that I need to say much more about the story of the 
development of mixed traits and virtues. I aim to begin to provide such a story in the 
next chapter. It is to that endeavor that we may now turn. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMMUNITY AND TRADITION WITHIN  
A CAPS BASED ACCOUNT OF PRE-ADULT MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
We have seen that some CAPS based accounts of virtue are empirically adequate. In 
addition to the primary features of CAPS, these accounts consist of the claims that global 
mixed character traits exist, that human beings can develop global mixed character traits 
into virtues, and that virtues are rare.
58
 I believe these claims raise several important 
questions about moral development. How, for example, does one acquire a global mixed 
character trait? Are human beings naturally born with them? If not, when do human 
beings acquire them? Once an individual has a global mixed character trait, how do they 
develop it into a virtue? Finally, and perhaps most troubling, how does one even know 
what constitutes as a virtue? 
 In this chapter, I hope at least to begin to answer these questions by discussing 
moral development in pre-adult human beings. I will do this in the process and context 
of arguing for four theses. First, I will argue that two important contemporary 
approaches to moral development are inadequate. Second, I will argue that one set of 
models of pre-adult moral development that does not have these shortcomings includes 
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 As I noted in the introduction, I am not arguing that a CAPS based account of virtue must contain the 
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the community and tradition based models of moral development.
59
 Third, I will contend 
that the broad framework of these models is compatible with the features of the CAPS 
based accounts of virtue that we discussed in chapter two. Finally, I will contend that 
these models are well-suited to play a significant role in pre-adult moral development 
within such CAPS based accounts of virtue and moral development. 
 
Poor Models of Moral Development: A Refutation 
During the 1970s and 80s, philosopher and psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg developed 
one of the most influential contemporary accounts of moral development.
60
 Building off 
of the work of Jean Piaget, Kohlberg claimed that moral development involved six 
distinct stages in moral reasoning, all of which revolved around the notion of justice.
61
  
The first two stages of Kohlberg’s account deal with what he calls 
preconventional morality. In stage one, human beings primarily perform moral reasoning 
about justice based on notions of obedience to rules, which they believe are 
unchangeable and absolute, in order to avoid punishment. In stage two, human beings 
begin to reason about what is just for individuals on an individual basis. In other words, 
people judge the justness of an action based on whether or not it meets the needs of the 
individual in question. Kohlberg argues that both of these stages primarily relate to how 
                                                 
59
 Throughout this paper I will use the terms ‘model’ and ‘models’ rather interchangeably. While I realize 
that this fails to account for an important distinction, the existence of versions of this model, I do this to 
allow myself to speak freely about the broad framework these models have in common.  
60
 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays in Moral Development 2 Vols. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981, 1984).  
61
 Kohlberg held that “virtue is not many, but one, and its name is justice.” See Essays, vol. 1, 39. For 
Piaget’s influential works, see The Moral Judgment of the Child  (New York: Free Press, 1932), and 
Science of Education and the Psychology of the Child (New York: Viking Press, 1970). 
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children perform moral reasoning. Furthermore, he characterizes children in rather 
monolithic terms. That is, he typically neglects the differences between children of the 
same age, and therefore argues as though nearly every child undergoes the same stages 
of moral development at particular times in their lives.  
 The third and fourth stages of Kohlberg’s account of moral development deal 
with what he calls conventional morality. These, along with the remaining two stages, 
characterize adolescents and adults. Here individuals take the concerns of society along 
with societal pressures into consideration during their moral deliberations. In stage three, 
often known as the “good boy-good girl” orientation, individuals focus on meeting social 
expectations and the specifics of their social roles. Kohlberg believes that human beings 
in this stage often focus on conforming to societal norms and on how their actions will 
justly or unjustly impact human relationships. This focus on others becomes crucial in 
stage four. Here individuals direct their moral reasoning to considerations about how a 
society functions smoothly.  Thus they fixate on the justness of obeying the law and 
performing their duty. 
 Kohlberg characterizes the final two stages of his account of moral development 
as postconventional morality. Human beings in these stages focus on the need for 
societal consensus on issues of justice. In stage five, human beings perform moral 
reasoning with the aim of coming to conclusions upon which members of their society 
should agree. In so doing, they take into consideration the various values and beliefs of 
the other members of their society. In the sixth and final stage, human beings obey what 
have become internalized abstract principles about justice. They believe that these 
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principles hold true for all societies, and that they should follow them even if they 
conflict with the mores and laws of their society. According to Kohlberg, these types of 
principles are only accessible to individuals with high capacities for moral reasoning, i.e. 
extremely morally mature adolescents or morally mature adults. 
 Over the past fifteen years, philosophers and psychologists have increasingly 
questioned Kohlberg’s account. For the purposes of our discussion, I want to consider 
what I take to be one of the most serious empirical deficiencies of his view. I here refer 
to a number of recent experiments in child psychology that  have shown that children 
exhibit moral reasoning capacities that are far greater than what Kohlberg deemed 
possible. Indeed, children seem to manifest behavior that is more in keeping with the 
higher two stages. For example, psychologists have found that three and four year old 
children often can distinguish moral judgments from social or conventional judgments 
and from personal judgments.
62
 According to Kohlberg account, children cannot have 
the reasoning capacities necessary for making such distinctions. Furthermore, children 
often identify and act on rather abstract moral principles.  For example, psychologists 
have found that children recognized and acted on the principle of equality, the claim that 
a group should equally divide its resources.
63
 Again, according to Kohlberg’s account, 
children cannot possess let alone act upon such abstract moral principles.  
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 E. Turiel, The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), and The Culture of Morality: Social Development, Context, and 
Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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 Although I believe these experiments with three and four year olds are 
problematic for Kohlberg’s view, I believe recent experiments on the moral behavior of 
infants are even more devastating for his account. For example, childhood 
developmental psychologist Jessica Sommerville has found significant evidence that 15 
month old infants can possess a working understanding of moral concepts such as 
compassion and the principle of equality.
64
 When alone and encountered by a stranger 
who drops their pen near the infant under observation, many infants will pick up the pen 
and attempt to hand it to the stranger. Many infants also share their toys when they are in 
a situation where they can see that one particular adult stranger does not have any. 
Finally, many children manifest a mixture of surprise and frustration at adults who did 
not equally share their toys with another adult. Again, children are not supposed to have 
such high levels of moral reasoning and understanding on Kohlberg’s view. 
 Before I move on to critique one other approach to moral development, I want to 
make two points that we should remember from Kohlberg’s shortcomings. It seems that 
an adequate account of pre-adult moral development needs to begin at least at infancy, 
particularly 15 months of age. I highlight 15 months because most experiments that I am 
familiar with have not found anywhere near the same level of moral behavior in younger 
children.
65
 In addition, we must refrain from viewing children, and for that matter human 
beings in general, in a monolithic manner. The experimenters of the studies I have 
referenced all cite that different children within their subject groups exhibited varying 
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65
 For a similar observation, see Sommerville et at. “The Development of Fairness”. 
  
 
46 
 
levels of understanding of moral concepts and consistent moral behavior. When it comes 
to moral development, we need to recognize and take into consideration the differences 
that exist between different human beings.  
As I mentioned above, I am not the only person to find Kohlberg’s account of 
moral development inadequate. Numerous philosophers and psychologists have leveled 
a wide range of critiques against his position. This group includes several prominent 
contemporary virtue theorists.
66
 I believe that many of these philosophers share a 
common problem; their accounts of moral development almost exclusively deal with 
moral development in adults. Therefore, they are inadequate, because they fail to 
account for the importance of pre-adult history in human moral development. Here I 
shall content myself with a brief examination of one of these accounts.   
 Nancy Snow’s presentation of a CAPS based account of virtue and the 
development of virtues is, to my knowledge, the most empirically informed account of 
its kind.
67
 In it she draws upon several leading psychologist in an attempt to provide a 
detailed account of the relationship between habitual actions, habitual virtuous actions, 
and goal-dependent automaticity. I find much of what Snow says about these 
relationships persuasive. What does trouble me, however, is that even though Snow’s 
account involves the claim that “…repeated encounters with situational cues trigger an 
agent’s virtue-relevant goals outside of her conscious awareness, resulting in her 
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habitual performance of virtuous actions in those circumstances”, it contains little by 
way of explaining how the pre-adult history of human beings impacts their development 
of virtuous actions and goals. Rather, Snow designates most of her account to 
considerations about how adults can cultivate virtues on her view. Let me suggest two 
reasons why this is troublesome. 
 As we have already seen, there are a number of studies that support the claim that 
even 15 month old infants are alert to moral concerns. If, as Snow would acknowledge, 
one’s character traits are shaped by one’s experiences and one’s methods of interpreting 
those experiences, then it seems reasonable and important to begin our discussions of 
moral development with the early stages of human experience and development. Recall, 
for instance, our discussion of Harry in the previous chapter. From a CAPS perspective 
and the perspective of the other psychological theories Snow embraces, it is possible that 
Harry’s temperament to feel fear when people speak loudly is connected to his 
experiences as an infant. It is quite possible, for example, that throughout his infancy his 
parents engaged in verbally loud fights that caused him great concern, hurt his ears, and 
contributed to his interpretative process that produces fear when he hears loud voices. 
Let’s assume that this pattern of behavior remained throughout the course of Harry’s 
pre-adult life. Given how deeply entrenched his method of interpretation is to the 
situational cue of loud voices, Harry may find it especially difficult to act courageously 
when people raise their voices at him. Whereas Snow’s account has the resources to 
acknowledge this and shed light on how difficult it is for Harry to act courageously in 
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these situations, Snow does not discuss these sorts of examples. Rather, her illustrations 
ignore the relevance of the entirety of an individual’s history. 
 A second reason why Snow’s nearly exclusive discussion of adults is problematic 
is that it ignores the importance of the stage of human life that psychologists call 
emerging adulthood.
 68
 According to psychologist Jeffery Jensen Arnett, emerging 
adulthood is the stage of life in which most human beings transition from adolescence to 
adulthood.
69
  This typically takes place between the time an individual is 18 to 25 years 
of age.
 70
  During these years, most human beings decide who and what they want to 
become. While this is especially true of vocations and romantic relationships, Arnett 
notes that it is during this time that individual’s look for a job and relationship that will 
provide them with a sense of fulfillment, it also holds for the more general moral views 
to which individuals subscribe. For example, many people determine whether or not to 
make their parent’s values and goals their own during emerging adulthood. This includes 
the decisions to either maintain or terminate their relationship with the social group with 
which their parent’s raised them. Either way, most human beings will assent to an idea 
about what they want life to be like, and they commit themselves to develop themselves 
in such a way that they can attain this goal.  
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 Much of my understanding of emergent adulthood is based on Erik Noftle’s lecture “Stability and 
Change in Early Emerging Adulthood.” One can access the video of this lecture at the following link on 
the Character Project’s website: http://thecharacterproject.com/videos.php.  
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and Adolescence 23 (1994):517-537; “Learning to stand alone: The contemporary American transition to 
adulthood in cultural and historical context” in Human Development 41 (1998): 295-315; and Emerging 
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University Press, 2004).  
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 Given the importance that Snow places on how one interprets situational cues in 
light of their goals, it seems to me that the absence of any discussion of the role and 
significance that emerging adulthood has on individuals is a significant shortcoming of 
her account. Again, it is in these pre-adult years that human beings most clearly exercise 
their ability to choose who they will be and what they are willing to do to become that 
person. This involves the active cultivation of certain character traits, behaviors, and 
interpretive frameworks. Because Snow’s view does not do this and it fails to address the 
impact of pre-adulthood on moral development, it is inadequate.
71
 
 
Community and Tradition Based Model of Moral Development: A Sketch 
I now want to turn to consider a model of moral development that I believe avoids the 
pitfalls of the previous two models. I shall call this model the community and tradition 
based model of moral development. Although contemporary philosophers such as 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Lawrence Blum have recently brought this model to the 
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 At this point, one may be inclined to think philosophers such as Kohlberg and Snow do not say much 
about child psychology because they are not confident in our knowledge about child psychology. I have 
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forefront of discussions about moral development, it is extremely old.
72
 Let us consider 
several of the features that many versions of this model have in common. 
 Blum identifies six general assumptions that, I believe, undergird many 
community and tradition based models of moral development.
73
 First, human beings are 
only able to learn and develop virtues within particular forms of social life. Second, 
human beings require communities to help them sustain their virtues. To put it more 
strongly, human beings can only sustain virtues within a community. Third, part of every 
human being’s moral identity is constituted by the communities in which they participate 
and are a part. Fourth, human beings need communities to help them appreciate and 
apply abstract principles in their daily lives. Fifth, some virtues only are recognizable as 
virtues from the perspective of a particular community. I take it that this means both that 
certain goods are only accessible and intelligible within a particular community, and that 
not all communities agree on what counts as a virtue. Finally, in order to maintain a 
good community and society, human beings need to cultivate civic virtues. This will, in 
turn, allow them to cultivate other virtues. 
  In addition to these features, many of the healthiest historic examples of 
communities that subscribed to a version of this model seem to have embraced several 
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 For contemporary treatments of this model, see MacIntyre’s  After Virtue, 3rd Edition (Notre Dame, IN: 
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more assumptions. All of them, for example, emphasized the historic side of how human 
beings develop. That is, they believe that human beings develop throughout their life, 
and that a proper account of moral development must address this. One sees this, for 
example, in how Augustine and Marcus Aurelius discuss their upbringing. Both of them 
spend a considerable amount of time detailing and thanking the impacts that various 
individuals and organizations had on their pre-adult and adult moral development.
 74
    
A second feature these versions share in common is that they contain a significant 
strain of fallibilism. One of the clearest examples of this view is medieval 
Augustinianism. Because of their use of dialectical argumentation to reach first 
principles, medieval Augustinians emphasized the need to recognize that one should 
hold any conclusion that one reached in a tentative manner. MacIntyre concisely 
captures this practice and belief. 
Since on the Augustinian conception the movement of enquiry is towards first 
principles, dialectic is necessarily its argumentative instrument. But since 
dialectic argues from premises so far agreed, or at least not put in question, to 
conclusions which are not necessary truths but only the most compelling 
conclusion to be arrived at so far, the work of dialectic always has an 
essentially uncompleted and provisional character. A dialectical conclusion is 
always open to further challenge.
75
  
 
One of the strengths of this posture is that it helps to diminish the static nature of 
communities. That is, because champions of this model at least theoretically 
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acknowledge that their views and practices may not have the answers to questions about 
the good and social conduct, they are at least theoretically open to revisions of their 
beliefs and practices about such issues. 
 The final additional characteristic that I want to highlight is that these models 
typically consisted of the explicit claim that people within a community should actively 
seek the development, moral and otherwise, of one another. The purpose of this 
development was to help the individual in question maximize their potential and their 
personal good. It was not, for example, to manipulate a person so that they would 
contribute to an outcome that people within an organization or society desired.
76
 This 
behavior typically demonstrates a lack of care for the individual. Champions of the 
community and tradition based model would deem this wrong and unnecessary because 
it would keep both the individual and their community from actually achieving virtue 
and the good life. Instead, they would argue that if the members of a community help 
one another develop and refrain from manipulating each other, they are much more 
likely to achieve virtue and the good life.  
 Up to this point we have primarily considered features of the community and 
tradition based models of moral development. I now want to discuss several important 
resources that philosophers often associate with this model. I do not mean to suggest that 
the features of this model do not count as resources of this model. I actually believe they 
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do. Rather, I simply mean that I now want to consider some of the more, if I may, 
specific resources of this model. As I do this, it is important that we remember that the 
wide range of resources I will discuss are meant to address this fact about human beings: 
different things are appropriate at different ages and stages, and different people will 
need different things at different ages and stages. 
 The first resource to note is the community. Within the community and tradition 
model, a number of human beings play a variety of social roles in order to help facilitate 
the good of that community. This, of course, includes the moral development of the 
individuals that make up the community. Social roles include but are not limited to 
familial positions, teachers, and overseers.
77
 The various social roles typically help to 
reinforce one another. So, for example, parents are usually held as the ones who are 
primarily responsible for their children. Yet all of the other social roles are meant, in one 
way or another, to help parents care for their children. Therefore, parents inform their 
children to obey their teachers, for example, and in so doing help to protect and nurture 
those in that role. In addition, the plurality of roles within a community helps to ensure 
that the members of the community have resources for moral development throughout 
the entirety of their lives. To once again use the example of teachers, the types of 
teachers one requires when one is an infant are usually quite different than the types of 
teachers one needs when one is an emerging adult. At least one reason for this is that the 
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components of moral and physical development involved with these stages of life are 
substantially different. We should also note that the closeness of relationships between 
people within the community will vary a great deal depending on the relationships and 
roles that the individuals in question have. Thus a parent will have a much more intimate 
role in the life of their child than say an individual who, as an overseer, monthly checks 
up on the overall health of that family. 
 At several points in my discussion of community I hinted at a second resource 
that this model has, namely teachers.
78
 Here I have in mind more of the ancient and 
medieval conception of a teacher rather than contemporary conceptions about a school 
teacher. I do not mean to suggest, however, that these two types of conceptions have 
little in common. On the contrary, I believe they share many characteristics. My point in 
highlighting this distinction is instead to stress the hands-on, intimate, apprentice like 
relationship that was a part of the ancient and medieval conception of a teacher. 
Teachers in this sense are people who serve as traditional gatekeepers and moral 
developers. That is, they have an extremely important role in shaping how one receives 
the tradition of their community and what path one takes for moral development. Unlike 
many contemporary classrooms, where very little time is spent on the moral 
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development of the students, teachers on this conception have the responsibility to 
impart information, skills, and character traits to their students for their student’s moral 
development.
79
 
 Many philosophers would find my previous statement rather odd. “How”, they 
might ask, “is one supposed to impart character traits to one’s students?” Proponents of 
the community and tradition based model of moral development historically have 
answered this question by identifying several resources of their model that teachers have 
the responsibility to disseminate to their students. I will classify these within three 
categories: non-fictional texts, fictional texts, and songs. With respect to non-fictional 
texts, traditions typically have a number of historical recordings (including oral history), 
sacred texts, sayings of proverbs, and catechisms that members of the tradition are 
supposed to know. Similarly, traditions usually have a number of fictional texts such as 
novels, poems, stories, and plays that their members are also supposed to know. These 
texts serve a number of purposes. For example, they contain important doctrines that 
shape the tradition and community. Together these doctrines convey a portrait of what 
the good life for the community and the individuals within it can and should look like. 
The texts also convey beliefs, desires, goals, feelings (in short, virtues), ways of life, and 
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somewhat concrete examples of all of these.
80
 Once again, these constitute the overall 
picture of what the good life consists in. Songs likewise convey doctrines, beliefs, 
desires, pictures, etc. that help to provide yet another distinct vehicle through which 
individuals encounter the components of the morality and moral tradition of their 
community.
81
 
 Teachers, on this model, have the responsibility to ensure that their students learn 
these texts and songs. Within this role, teachers help their students to face, and 
sometimes avoid, a number of challenges. Focusing on texts, philosophers within the 
Confucian tradition have argued that the first challenge teachers help their students avoid 
is the possibility that they read inappropriate or unhelpful texts.
82
 If, for instance, the 
tradition of the community consists in the belief that greed is evil, teachers should try to 
help their students abstain from encounters with texts that present greed as attractive or 
good.  The same holds for songs. Furthermore, the style and form of the texts and songs 
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are also important, according to many champions of this model of moral development, 
because they too communicate values and a vision of what one should pursue and 
appreciate in life.
83
 
 I believe the previous statements raise an important question. Do members within 
a community on this model have access to resources that are external to their community 
and tradition? For many historic examples of these models, the answer is yes. One 
reason for this is that many texts that the members within a community would learn 
referenced rival traditions and communities. Part of the teacher’s responsibility is to 
present these rival traditions and explain how their tradition responds to them. While I 
recognize the presentation that the teachers give is shaped by the teacher’s tradition, I 
still believe this practice provides access to resources and perspectives that are external 
to the tradition. A second reason is that many of the historic examples of communities 
that engaged in this model of moral development lived in rather pluralistic settings. This 
required that these communities interact with the different and often time rival traditions 
and philosophies of their neighbors. Thus the members of all of these communities had 
access to external resources in so far as they had access to the rival traditions and 
communities in their societies. 
 Returning our attention back to teachers, it is important that we understand that 
as teachers provide their students with the proper curriculum, they also help them face 
the challenge of correctly interpreting this curriculum. Confucian philosophers often 
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described this difficulty in terms of the fact that most of the important texts of their 
tradition were difficult to understand and apply. In this regard, teachers helped their 
students eschew inappropriate interpretations and grasp the actual lessons that their 
tradition’s texts had to teach.84 This already seemingly difficult task is in fact more 
difficult than most contemporary philosophers have recognized. The reason for this is 
that many champions of this model believed that students required a certain constitution 
before they could properly grasp the meaning of the texts. In order to acquire that 
constitution, however, the students needed to have grasped the meaning of the texts. I 
believe MacIntyre captures this paradox in the following comment about the 
Augustinian tradition.  
In medieval Augustinian culture the relationship between the key texts of that 
culture and the reader was twofold. The reader was assigned the task of 
interpreting the text, but also had to discover, in and through his or her reading 
of those texts, that they in turn interpret the reader. What the reader, as thus 
interpreted by the texts, has to learn about him or herself is that it is only the 
self as transformed through and by the reading of the texts which will be 
capable of reading the texts aright. So the reader, like any learner within a craft 
tradition, encounters apparent paradox at the outset, a Christian version of the 
Paradox of Plato’s Meno: it seems that only by learning what the texts have to 
teach can he or she come to read those texts aright, but also that only by reading 
them aright can he or she learn what the texts have to teach.
85
 
  
This claim raises an obvious question. How could one possibly meet the conditions set 
forth in this bi-conditional interpretive paradox?   
 The answer to this question, medieval Augustinians contended, lies in the role of 
the teacher. To once again quote MacIntyre, 
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The person in this predicament requires two things: a teacher and an obedient 
trust that what the teacher, interpreting the text, declares to be good reasons for 
transforming oneself into a different kind of person—and thus a different kind 
of reader—will turn out to be genuinely good reasons in the light afforded by 
that understanding of the texts which becomes available only to the transformed 
self.
86
 
 
Although human beings in any stage of moral development must exercise varying 
degrees of the trust that MacIntyre describes, it is especially important that they do so in 
a high degree during the early stages of their lives. This, of course, is what human 
children do. They trust (perhaps instinctively) their parents and teachers to teach them 
well. One condition that often proves crucial for this level of trust is that these 
relationships are characterized by love. That is, children, and for that matter all human 
beings, tend to flourish developmentally when they are in relationships where they know 
they are loved by those who are molding them.
87
  
One of the most important ways that teachers begin to help their students rightly 
interpret texts and songs is by teaching them the language of their tradition, particularly 
its moral concepts and terms.
88
 Indeed, it is because numerous champions of the 
community and tradition based model recognized the importance of linguistic education 
that they often required parents and teachers to teach their children catechisms.
89
 These 
texts were usually set in question and answer format, and were written in a manner that 
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lent itself to memorization. Teachers made sure that they taught even the more difficult 
concepts and terms (moral or otherwise) within these catechisms, because they believed 
that the children needed these conceptual resources so that they would have a relatively 
high level of familiarity with them once they were old enough to understand them more 
fully. This too, therefore, was a method through which teachers formed their students so 
that they could receive what they had to teach, even if part of this included what they or 
someone else would teach them later in life. 
 The previous comment hints at another important aspect of how teachers instruct 
their students on this model. Although I have already touched on it, I believe it is 
important to once again address how teachers accommodate the process-like nature of 
moral development. That is, teachers must teach their students in a way that corresponds 
to their particular stage of development at that particular time. Often this requires that 
teachers use different resources for different stages of development. Yet even if they use 
the same resources they will use them in different ways. Here, of course, it is important 
that the teacher knows their student and can meet them at their developmental level. So 
with respect to texts, a teacher should know what texts the student can handle and when 
they are ready to move on to a different and perhaps more difficult or mature text. For 
example, a teacher will probably need to teach a child a catechism differently than they 
teach it to an adolescent.  
 One aspect of teaching texts and songs that I have not done much to highlight up 
to this point is how doing so shapes the interpretive mechanisms of students. To my 
knowledge, every community that has embraced this model of moral development has 
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maintained that when teachers teach texts and songs they provide their students with 
access to concepts and construals that are constitutive of the good life. As one sings a 
lament, for example, one becomes more aware of what is involved in the emotion of 
sorrow. Furthermore, adherents to this model of moral development often argued that 
one learned sorrow differently through singing songs than from reading about sorrow a 
character felt in a book. In other words, not only do the variety of texts and songs 
provide human beings with important concepts and construals, but they often do so in 
ways that the other cannot. Clearly, a good teacher is aware of these issues, and would 
keep them in mind as they train their students.  
 I want to highlight one final responsibility that teachers typically have in this 
model. Teachers usually knowingly serve as exemplars for their students. That is, they 
actively try to exemplify the various values and beliefs that their tradition and 
community uphold.
90
 This allows students to gain access to the various components of 
the teacher’s virtues, for example, in a rather concrete manner. As they interact with 
their teachers and watch how they behave over a period of time, they gain insight into 
the morality of their tradition and community. They see, for instance, the actions 
appropriate to their community’s understanding of compassion. Furthermore, they gain 
an understanding of when such actions are appropriate. This helps them to understand 
what the values and beliefs of their tradition look like in practice. 
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 At this point I want to make a few brief observations about the stages of the 
relationship between individuals and their teachers. As we have seen, teachers teach 
their students different things depending on students’ level of development. We have 
also noted that sometimes students’ will have different teachers for different stages of 
development. What we have not considered is that in most community and tradition 
based models there comes a point when the student in question learns what their pre-
adult teachers have to teach them. At this stage the individual is at a place where they 
must choose either to embrace or reject the tradition and the community. In other words, 
they must choose to make the values, beliefs, and way of life that their instructors have 
taught them their own. Those who do embrace the tradition and community should be 
well-suited to contribute to their tradition and community as informed and well-shaped 
members of their tradition and community.   
 There is one more resource of community and tradition based models of moral 
development that I want to highlight. All of these models have a variety of liturgies in 
which the members of the community participate. By liturgy I mean tradition informed 
public services or events in which members of the community that subscribe to that 
tradition participate in conveying, experiencing, and reinforcing the beliefs and values of 
their tradition. It seems that at least one reason for the existence of liturgies is that they 
further the sense of common identity and experience between the members of the 
community. As they participate in a ceremony or ritual that exemplifies the 
commitments of their tradition, they continue to shape themselves so that they better 
exemplify those same commitments. The Greeks, for example, often participated in 
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feasts in which members of the community rehearsed plays intended to instruct the 
community and remind them of their identity. Religious communities, historically 
speaking, usually have liturgies in which the members actively participate in rituals that 
reinforce the doctrines, feelings, and actions that the community supports. Moreover, 
these services often engaged all five senses and memory of the participant. This, I take 
it, helped to further the way in which the content of the service was internalized.  
 
Community and Tradition Based Model of Moral Development: A Defense 
 
We are now in a position to examine two claims about the community and tradition 
based model of moral development. The first of these is that it avoids the shortcomings 
involved with Kohlberg and Snow’s accounts of moral development. On the one hand, 
the primary inadequacy with Kohlberg’s model is that it fails to account for empirical 
findings on the moral thoughts and behaviors of infants and children. Because of this, his 
account ignores this important stage of development. I take it that the community and 
tradition based model of moral development eschews this failure. Its emphasis on 
developing individual children in accordance with their level of moral development, 
particularly when it comes to the use of catechisms to teach them moral concepts as 
early as possible, seem to at least partially account for this.  
On the other hand, Snow’s model neglected much of the historical nature of 
human beings, particularly their pre-adult history. This is problematic given the 
influence that one’s pre-adult history has on their character development, especially the 
significant role emerging adulthood has on the type of person one decides to attempt to 
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become. Indeed, as one aims to become a particular sort of person, one adopts an 
interpretive framework that helps one become that sort of person. It seems to me that the 
community and tradition based model of moral development also addresses these issues. 
The model clearly accounts for the history of pre-adult moral development. It also seems 
to account for emerging adulthood. According to this model, once individuals reach a 
certain level of development, they must decide to either embrace or reject their pre-adult 
instruction, along with the tradition and community that undergirded it. This, it seems to 
me, is in keeping with what Arnett points to in his account of emerging adulthood. That 
is, Arnett’s account stresses that human beings get to a certain point where they choose 
what type of person they want to become, and the community and tradition based model 
of moral development actually includes that stage of development. Furthermore, it has 
resources that help to prepare individuals for that point.  
I believe it is important that I pause to clarify one aspect about the community 
and tradition based model of moral development before I argue that it is compatible with 
our findings from the previous chapter. Whereas I have not said much about how this 
model addresses adult moral development, champions of this model have gone to great 
lengths to do so.
91
 Indeed, I believe that the features of this model that I set out provide 
the resources for this. Unfortunately, the purpose of this chapter and limitations of space 
do not permit me to expand on this issue. Although I will say a bit more about this in the 
next chapter, I will now set this issue aside for the remainder of this chapter. 
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To return our attention to pre-adult moral development, I now want to argue that 
the community and tradition based model of moral development is compatible with our 
findings about CAPS based accounts of virtue in chapter two. I will begin my argument 
by establishing that the model is compatible with the seven salient features of CAPS 
accounts of character traits. 
The first feature of CAPS that we discussed is that CAPS theorists maintain that 
human beings are interpretive creatures. The emphasis on developing how individuals 
interpret the world within the community and tradition based model of moral 
development is surely compatible with this claim. The second feature of CAPS is the 
belief that the interpretation of external and internal stimuli activates social-cognitive 
units.  Once again, the emphasis that the community and tradition based model places on 
the relationships between interpretation, character, and action is compatible with this. 
The third feature of CAPS is the assertion that pre-existing personality variables 
influence how people interpret stimuli. This is compatible with the assumption in the 
community and tradition based model that different people will need different things at 
different ages and stages. That is, it is quite plausible to argue that one of the reasons 
different people need different things at different ages and stages is that they have 
different pre-existing personality variables that influence how they interpret stimuli. 
This, for example, is something that parents and teachers would need to account for in 
their dealings with children. 
The fourth feature of CAPS is that repeated activation of a specific set of social-
cognitive units to specific set of stimuli builds a rather stable character trait. This is 
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precisely what teachers assume when they expose their students to texts and songs. That 
is, they at least implicitly acknowledge that continued exposure to the material in texts 
and songs will form their student’s character. In addition, they also assume that their 
student’s exposure to them and their (the teacher’s) behavior will also impact their 
character.  
Although not explicitly covered by the community and tradition based model of 
moral development, the fifth feature of CAPS seems compatible with our model. That is 
to say, the distinction between the structure of character traits and the dynamics of trait 
interaction does not conflict with any of the tenets or resources of the community and 
tradition based model.  
The sixth and seventh features of CAPS are compatible with the overall approach 
to development that undergirds the community and tradition based model; this model 
assumes that human beings can accurately express human behavior in terms of 
“If…then” signatures, and that character traits are generalizable. Indeed, these are 
working assumptions for any model of moral development that emphasizes the role and 
importance of virtues. The very nature of virtues requires this. These are, of course, what 
the community and tradition based model attempts to address through resources such as 
teachers and liturgy. In other words, champions of this model believe that teachers and 
liturgy help to form consistent and global character traits in the members of 
communities. 
So our model is compatible with the features of CAPS. This, however, is not 
enough. We must also determine if our model is compatible with the existence of global 
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mixed character traits and the rarity thesis. With respect to global mixed character traits, 
we need to note that there is substantial empirical evidence that these traits are not found 
in children anywhere near to the extent that they are found in adults. I side with Christian 
Miller’s interpretation of this evidence when he claims that these findings support “…the 
idea that such traits are not features of human nature but are acquired habitually over 
time.”92 I also believe this interpretation is consistent with the empirical studies on infant 
prosocial behavior that I referenced earlier. Thus our model needs to be compatible with 
the initial acquisition and further development of mixed character traits so that they 
become global character traits.  
I take it that this requirement is similar to that of the development of CAPS 
character traits in general. Thus it is through resources like a community, teachers, texts, 
songs, and liturgies that individuals initially acquire mixed character traits, and 
subsequently go on to develop them into global mixed character traits. Furthermore, it 
seems possible that individuals can go on to develop these into virtues through additional 
participation in methods of moral development. I do not believe this claim is unique to 
me. It seems that most accounts of virtue have consisted of the claim that human beings 
have to work at cultivating their character traits so that they become virtues. Champions 
of the community and tradition based model of moral development are no different in 
this regard, and thus can accommodate the development of mixed character traits. 
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As for the rarity thesis, I see no reason to think that it is not compatible with the 
features of the community and tradition based model of moral development. That is not 
to say that every virtue theorists holds to this thesis. Nor do I mean to suggest that every 
historic example of this model is consistent with this thesis. That is a more nuanced 
matter upon which particular traditions and communities have disagreed.
93
 Indeed, many 
of the particular details of the historic models differ. This is simply one such example of 
a point of disagreement. In some ways this is an outworking of the fifth feature of these 
models that Blum identifies—namely, some virtues only are recognizable as virtues 
from the perspective of a particular community. If these communities disagree on what 
counts as a virtue, it ought not to surprise us that many other details about their accounts 
also differ. Because I have tried to provide only a broad framework that these models 
share, I do not believe this is a problem for my presentation. I will say more about this 
below. 
By arguing for the compatibility of the community and tradition based model of 
moral development with our findings about CAPS based accounts of virtue, I tried to 
hint at reasons why that support my second claim: that this model of moral development 
is also well-suited to play a role in an account of pre-adult moral development within a 
CAPS based account of virtue. The emphasis that this model places on interpretation, the 
development of social-cognitive units, the historic nature of human development, and 
number of individuals involved and invested an individual’s moral development surely 
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are well-suited for such a CAPS based account of virtue that acknowledges the existence 
of global mixed character traits and the rarity thesis. In saying this I recognize that as 
one fills in this model with more details this may not hold. Yet I do not believe this is a 
problem for my argument. I simply am trying to propose the framework of a model that 
is compatible with our findings in chapter two and the beginning of this chapter. I am not 
trying to provide an exhaustive account of virtue or moral development. Such a project 
goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I take it that I have accomplished 
my end. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have argued for the inadequacy of two contemporary models of moral 
development that one could try to utilize within a CAPS based account of virtue. I have 
gone on to argue that the community and tradition based model of moral development 
avoids the shortcomings of these models and is both compatible and well-suited for a 
CAPS based account of virtue that is in keeping with our findings in chapter two. In 
doing this, I have paid special attention to the historic nature of moral development. Yet 
I stopped my discussion of moral development with emerging adulthood.  Given the 
extremely formative nature of this stage of human life, it seems important that I provide 
at least some sort of an account for human moral development post-emerging adulthood. 
To this end I wish to consider one vehicle of adult moral development which I believe is 
both compatible with but not restricted to the model of moral development I have argued 
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for here. It is to a presentation and defense of this vehicle of adult moral development 
that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CAPS, CHARACTER-FRIENDSHIPS, AND  
MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADULTS  
 
Up to this point we have seen that some CAPS based accounts of virtue are empirically 
adequate, and that the community and tradition based model of human moral 
development is compatible with and well-suited for pre-adult human moral development 
within such accounts. In this chapter I want to further extend the account of moral 
development from which virtue theorists who embrace CAPS can draw by considering 
one vehicle of moral development for adult human beings—namely, character-
friendships.
94
  
 In what follows I will defend four claims about character-friendships within a 
CAPS based account of virtue and moral development. First, the existence and role of 
character-friendships within adult moral development is compatible with the community 
and tradition based model of moral development. Indeed, there is a sense in which such 
friendships naturally follow from how that model portrays moral development in 
emerging adulthood. Second, character-friendships are possible within CAPS based 
accounts of virtue that recognize the existence of global mixed character traits and tie 
virtues to human flourishing. Third, character-friendships are well-suited to play an 
important role in the moral development of adult human beings within CAPS based 
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 John M. Cooper coined the phrase character-friendships in his essay “Aristotle on the Forms of 
Friendship” in The Review of Metaphysics Vol. 30 No. 4 (1977):619-648. 
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accounts of virtue that both recognize the existence of global mixed character traits and 
tie virtues to human flourishing. Fourth, recent empirical research on the impact of 
groups on human helping behavior does not subvert the importance of character-
friendships in adult moral development. This is because its results are mixed and the 
understanding of friendship is too poorly defined to be relevant. 
 
Character-Friendships: A Sketch 
There are six salient features of character-friendships that I will outline in this section. I 
will introduce each feature by referring to a passage in which Aristotle seems to discuss 
that feature. My primary aim, however, is not to defend a particular interpretation of 
Aristotle. Rather, I am trying to motivate qualities of character-friendships that I and 
others have attributed to Aristotle’s account in order to highlight how these qualities are 
relevant to CAPS based accounts of virtues that tie virtues to human flourishing.
95
 Thus 
my primary aim is to introduce aspects of character-friendships that are intelligible 
within certain CAPS accounts of virtue, and my secondary aim is to show that it is not 
unreasonable for one to take character-friendships so described to be closely related to 
the traditional Aristotelian notion.  
 The first feature of character-friendships is an assumption or belief that 
undergirds all of the other features: there are states and things that truly are good for 
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 My understanding of Aristotle’s account of character-friendships has been influenced most by Julia 
Annas, Talbot Brewer, John M. Cooper, and Nancy Sherman.  
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human beings and these states and things are a part of human flourishing.
96
 Aristotle 
famously begins the Nicomachean Ethics by inquiring into the nature of these states. 
He avers that they correspond to the proper function or activity of human beings: 
“…human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (NE 
1098a15-17) If one rejects the assumption that some states and things truly are good 
for human beings goods, then the other features of character-friendships become 
unintelligible. This is because they assume that there are real human goods which 
are part of human flourishing. This is not to say, however, that one must commit to 
a specific theory of meta-ethics to hold this view and make the other features of 
character-friendships intelligible. As we have seen, Aristotle defines the human 
good in terms of metaphysical beliefs about human forms and human nature.
97
 Yet 
the notion of specifically human goods is not specific to Aristotle. One could, for 
example, explain the general human good in terms of the proper functions that have 
been selected for in the evolutionary history of humanity.
98
 Likewise, one could 
define the human good in terms of a design plan or participation with the Good. 
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 Throughout this thesis I will understand human flourishing as something that is constituted by a number 
of goods things (states, objects, etc.), and is itself a good thing. 
97
  See NE 1156a5-1158a26 for a discussion on how Aristotle ties character-friendships to the human 
good.  
98
 I realize that this claim may appear to run contrary to Philip Kitcher’s claims in “Essence and 
Perfection” in Ethics, 110, (1999):59-83. However, Kitcher only addresses attempts to ground accounts of 
virtue in a biological essence that all human beings share.  If one utilizes Ruth Milikan’s account of proper 
function (1984a; 1989a; 1998), then one can avoid this. Therefore, this account is immune from the 
devastating critiques Kitcher levels at biologically minded perfectionist accounts of virtue.     
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However one does it, one must account for this to make the below features 
intelligible.
99
  
 The second feature of character-friendships is that they are an outworking of 
the fact that human beings are social creatures. Being in relationships with other 
human beings is part of the human good. According to Aristotle, human well-being 
“is relational, whereas in the case of a god, he is himself his own well-being.” 
(E.E.1245b18-19) Elsewhere Aristotle claims that human flourishing consists in 
living life with parents, children, spouses, friends, and fellow citizens because “a 
human being is by nature political and social.” (1097b9-11; See 1169b18-19) Some 
of these relationships are instrumental to human flourishing, and others are intrinsic 
to human flourishing. Aristotle seems to maintain that friendships are both 
instrumental and intrinsic to human flourishing.
100
 On the one hand, friendships are 
instrumental, because without them human beings cannot perform the actions of 
which human flourishing consists.
101
 On the other, friendships are intrinsic to 
human flourishing because the lack of them “spoils one’s flourishing.”102 As we will 
soon see, Aristotle argues that the best sorts of friendships that are intrinsic to 
human flourishing are character-friendships. 
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 Humean accounts of virtue, for example, are not compatible with this feature of character-friendships, 
because they do not tie the virtues to human flourishing. 
100
 For a similar interpretation see Sherman “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life” in Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research Vol. 47, No. 4 (1987):593-594. 
101
 “Yet evidently, as we said, [human flourishing] requires in addition external goods; for it is impossible 
or not easy to do excellent deeds without resources. For an individual performs many actions through the 
use of instruments, through friends…” (NE 1099a31f) 
102
 See NE 1099a31-b4, 1169b10, 1154a4, 1155a5-6, and 1169b16-17. Although Aristotle uses philia in an 
extremely broad manner, these passages are, I take it, examples where he rather clearly has the genuine 
forms of philia in mind. That is, those instances where human beings reciprocate goodwill (eunoia) 
between each other. See NE 115b32-35. 
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 The third and fourth aspects of character-friendships are closely intertwined. 
Character-friendships are based on reciprocal affection and choice, respectively. As 
Aristotle explains,   
It is apparent from these things that the primary sort of friendship, that among 
good persons, requires mutual affect and mutual choice with regard to one 
another…This friendship thus only occurs among human beings, for they alone 
are conscious of reasoned choices (prohaireseis). (EE 1236b3-6). 
 
Later in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle reiterates the reciprocal choice involved in 
character-friendships. 
If the activity of friendship is a reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of 
the acquaintance of one another, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is 
in general a reciprocal choice (antiprohairesis) of the things that are without 
qualification good and pleasant, because they are good and pleasant 
(1237a3off). 
 
The significance of these claims involves Aristotle’s use of the term prohairesis. 
 Prohairesis is a “reasoned choice that is expressive of a character and the overall 
ends of that character.”103 In this regard, Aristotle believes that when human beings 
choose character-friends they chose someone who shares their commitments and ends. 
These commitments and ends reflect what one understands human flourishing in general 
and one’s form of this flourishing in particular to consist of. Character-friendships are 
the product of two individuals’ understandings of human flourishing and the character, 
goals, and way of living that the individuals form in light of this understanding. So, 
before one can have character-friends, one must hold a particular view of human 
flourishing and live in light of it.  
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 Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship,” 597. I am indebted to Sherman for initially drawing my attention 
to the role that prohairesis plays in Aristotle’s account of character-friendships. 
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 This claim raises an important question: How does one ascertain whether or not 
another individual is committed to a view of human flourishing that is in keeping with 
their own? The answer to this is the fifth feature of character-friendships. According to 
Aristotle, one can only determine this by spending a significant amount of time with 
another individual. 
Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men 
cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; nor can they admit 
each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been 
trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other 
wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the 
fact; for a wish for a friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not (NE 
1156b25-32).  
 
Because one’s actions reflect their character, and one’s character reflects their deeply 
held beliefs, desires, goals, and plans for attaining their goals, spending a substantial 
amount of time with an individual will provide one with the opportunity to gain an 
accurate view of whether or not another individual could be one’s character-friend. This 
idea is what motivates Aristotle’s understanding of homonoia.104  
 According to Aristotle, character-friends will have the sameness of mind 
regarding how they pursue their shared ends through practical means. As Aristotle 
explains, 
Some have thought friendship to be unanimity of feeling and those who have 
such a consensus to be friends. But friendship is not a consensus concerning 
everything, but a consensus concerning practical matters for the parties 
involved and concerning those things that contribute to living together (EE 
1241a16-18). 
 
                                                 
104
 I am indebted, once again, to Sherman for helping me see the importance of homonoia in Aristotle’s 
account of character-friendships.  
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In choosing a character-friend, one chooses to live life with another human in such a 
way that one commits oneself to pursuing a common view of human flourishing within a 
range of practical strategies. In so doing, one is committed to both one’s own flourishing 
and the flourishing of one’s friend. This, of course, holds for the other individual as well. 
So time spent with another person is what enables one to make the reasoned choice to 
befriend someone once one ascertains that that person shares one’s ends and methods for 
attaining those ends.  
 The sixth and final feature of character-friendships we will consider is how 
character-friendships help to enable the individuals in these friendships improve and 
develop one another. Aristotle argues that  
The friendship of good persons is good, being increased by their 
companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities 
and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mold of 
characteristics they approve (NE 1172a10-15). 
 
Two ideas here deserve emphasis. First, even good people, people who are widely 
recognized for their positive moral development, can improve. This is because Aristotle 
believes that human beings never reach a point where it is appropriate or good to cease 
their moral development.
105
 One reason Aristotle makes this claim is that he does not 
believe virtues, character, or human flourishing are static. He believes that the 
cultivation of all three of these is an ongoing process with various rhythms that depend 
upon the particular person and their situation. He discusses this in the Politics, for 
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 Julia Annas’s recent claim that the drive to aspire is a necessary part of a virtue seems to highlight this 
point as well. See Annas’s Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) especially pp. 17-26, 
54-58. 
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example, when he says, “Inasmuch as these different functions belong to a different 
prime of life, and one requires wisdom and the other strength, they are to be assigned to 
different persons” (Pol. 1329a9ff). Note that Aristotle’s description of the non-static 
nature of moral development seems to assume that what is good for an individual at one 
stage of life may not be good for that same individual at another stage of life. In other 
words, the metaphor of reaching a finish-line does not fully capture the nature of the 
human good. Rather, the metaphor of running a long race, taking into account the 
components and stages involved in such a race, which at least does not end until death is 
a more accurate metaphor.
106
  
 The second point to note from the previous quotation about character-friends is 
that one of the ways human beings can improve is by molding themselves in light of the 
positive characteristics of their character-friends. For example, as I consider the virtues 
my character-friend Lawrence has cultivated and developed, I may observe that he is 
more virtuous than me with regard to courage. Perhaps because of reasons related to 
moral luck, Lawrence simply has had more opportunity to develop courage than I.
107
 As 
I come to recognize this and appreciate the particular excellence Lawrence has achieved, 
I can begin to mold myself to have the courage I see in Lawrence. Furthermore, because 
of the reciprocal nature of character-friendships, he has committed to help me cultivate 
and develop the courage I admire in him. Note that in this case Lawrence serves two 
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  Of course, Aristotle contends that observers cannot know at the point of death if the deceased 
individual lived a good life. They must wait, perhaps several years, before they will have the information 
required to make that judgment. 
107
 For a clear and seminal discussion of moral luck see Thomas Nagel’s essay “Moral Luck” in Mortal 
Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chapter 3. 
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roles. First, he serves as a concrete example of courage from which I gain a richer 
appreciation of myself and the virtue of courage. Second, he serves as a co-laborer in my 
project to become more courageous.  
 
Character-friendships and the Community and Tradition Based Model of Moral 
Development: A Defense  
 
Before we consider the compatibility of character-friendships with CAPS based accounts 
of virtue, I want to make a few brief observations about the relationship between 
character-friendships and the community and tradition based model of moral 
development. I ended our discussion of moral development in the previous chapter by 
discussing how the community and tradition based model addresses the distinctive marks 
of moral development that psychologists associate with emerging adulthood. Recall that 
it is at this stage of development that many human beings determine who they want to be 
and what types of goals they will pursue to that end. Thus, as we noted, this often is the 
stage of life in which human beings decide whether or not they will remain members of 
the community and tradition that shaped them during their pre-adult years. This is 
because at this point in life they should have a level of understanding about their 
community and tradition that enables them to evaluate as an informed insider. That is, 
they should, all things being equal, have the resources to evaluate their community and 
tradition from the perspective and resources of their community and tradition.
108
 We also 
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 I have focused on the internal resources of the community to avoid philosophical questions about the 
access that individuals within a community have to evaluative resources that are external to their 
community. Yet in the previous chapter I noted that members of a community do have at least some access 
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noted that at this level of development individuals should, all things being equal, have 
the ability to realize where and how they need to develop and extend themselves and 
their tradition. By my lights, these characteristics make the end of emerging adulthood 
an extremely appropriate time for human beings to make the sort of relationships that are 
involved in character-friendships.  
 I take it that it is not particularly interesting or important that the first and second 
features of character-friendships, the beliefs that certain states and things are good for 
human beings and that human beings are social creatures, are compatible with the 
characteristics of the final stages of emerging adulthood. This compatibility seems 
somewhat trivial. What I think is particularly interesting and important is that the third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth features of character-friendships are strongly compatible with the 
outcomes of emerging adulthood. Furthermore, I take it that this suggests that character-
friendships are an appropriate vehicle for adult moral development that naturally picks 
up such development where we finished our discussion of the previous model. Let us 
briefly consider this claim. 
 A reasoned choice, reciprocity, like-mindedness, and the desire to help one 
another improve, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth features of character-friendships, are 
precisely what becomes available at the end of emerging adulthood.
109
 That is to say, it 
                                                                                                                                                
to the perspectives of other communities because this is included in their education. I take it that this gives 
them some access to resources that are external to their community. That being said, I believe it is better 
for me to set this issue aside for the remainder of this paper. The task of addressing it is simply beyond the 
confines of this paper. 
109
 I do not mean to suggest that these are unavailable prior to emerging adulthood. I believe they are 
available before and after emerging adulthood, and, in a manner that is tough to pin down, within the 
process of emerging adulthood. Yet there is something distinctive about the way that human beings choose 
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is at the end of this stage that human beings typically select their commitments and ends 
for themselves. Thus in a very real and strong sense, if an individual chooses to stay 
within a community and tradition, the commitments and ends of that community and 
tradition become their own. They are no longer, for example, simply their parents’. This 
allows other individuals to determine if they share these commitments and ends, and in 
turn pursue a character-friendship. Furthermore, because human beings typically choose 
how they will pursue their goals during emerging adulthood, individuals can also 
determine if they are like-minded in their pursuit of their shared commitments and ends. 
The combination of the previous two features provides individuals with the resources to 
share mutual affection, as Aristotle understood it. That is, the fact that they share so 
much in common will lend to their ability to care mutually for one another. Because of 
their commitment to one another and their common ends, they will aid one another in 
their pursuits to develop themselves and their community and tradition. 
So it seems that character-friendships naturally pick up human moral 
development where we ended our discussion of the community and tradition based 
model of moral development. At this point I believe that it is important for me to make 
two points.  First, I do not mean to suggest that the community and tradition based 
model of moral development is irrelevant to adult moral development. To the contrary, I 
take it that if that model is correct, then one’s community and tradition are highly 
significant to one’s adult moral development. What I do mean to suggest, however, is 
                                                                                                                                                
to embrace a particular vision of life and attempt to become a person that fits within that vision that sets 
the end of this stage of development apart from the other stages.  
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that character-friendships seem like a natural component to adult moral development 
within that model of moral development. Whereas they do not seem quite as feasible for 
individuals in emerging adulthood, they seem highly plausible within adult human 
beings.  
 Second, we should distinguish between a community in the sense that we 
discussed it in the previous chapter from character-friendships and the social networks 
that emerge from them. At least one important difference between character-friends and 
communities is that one does not have to exercise a reasoned choice or mutual affection 
toward every member of one’s community, whereas one does need to exercise these 
towards one’s character-friendships. This is because communities, as we have described 
them, involve a large of number of people, both living and deceased, who help to 
facilitate and extend the tradition of that group. A Russian Marxist in the 1980’s may 
have great affection for Engel and Marx as members of that individual’s community. Yet 
the Russian Marxist can never be character-friends with Engel and Marx because they 
cannot reciprocate the individual’s affection. Nor, for that matter, could they actively 
help that individual pursue his ends. Here I take it that both an individuals’ presence and 
ongoing agency are necessary conditions for character-friendships. This does not mean 
that all of the living members of an individual’s community are that individual’s 
character-friend. Often times most members of a community will not have mutual 
affection, as we have described, for one another. For a variety of reasons, including the 
fact that one can only exercise such affection to a limited number of people, they never 
enter into such relationships. In other words, every character-friend is a member of an 
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individual’s community, but not every member of an individual’s community is a 
character-friend of that individual.
110
 
 
Character-friendships in a CAPS Based Account of Virtue: A Defense   
We are now in a position to determine if character-friendships are possible within a 
CAPS based account of virtue. Recall that there are seven salient features of CAPS 
based accounts of character traits. First, these accounts contain the assumption that 
human beings are interpretive creatures. Second, they contain the claim that the 
interpretation of external and internal stimuli activates social-cognitive units. Third, they 
include the belief that pre-existing personality variables influence how people interpret 
stimuli. Fourth, they consist of the claim that repeated activation of a specific set of 
social-cognitive units to specific set of stimuli builds a rather stable character trait. Fifth, 
they recognize the distinction between the structure of character traits and the dynamics 
of trait interaction. Sixth, they include the claim that we can reasonably describe 
character traits in terms of “if…then” behavioral signatures. Finally, they contain the 
claim that CAPS character traits can be generalizable over a wide range of objectively 
different situations.   
 The beliefs that there is an objective human good, that the human good involves 
the social component of human beings, and that character traits are CAPSs are all 
compatible. Similarly, the claim that some human friendships consist of reciprocal 
affection, choice, and sameness of mind is compatible with a CAPS account of character 
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traits. As we have seen, CAPS theorists maintain that over time people reveal their 
character-traits through the actions that they do and do not perform. Therefore the 
beliefs, feelings, self-regulatory plans, and goals of which stable character traits consist 
will manifest themselves in a number of situations where their possessor consistently 
interprets a particular stimulus or set of stimuli. Thus one can observe the actions of 
another individual over a period of time and ascertain whether they share one’s 
commitments, beliefs, views, and practical methods of pursuing human flourishing. If 
they do coincide, and both parties recognize this, then both parties can enter into a 
character-friendship. 
 Finally, the belief that character-friends improve and develop one another is 
compatible with the features of CAPS character traits, particularly one that recognizes 
the existence of global mixed character traits. As we have seen, CAPS proponents 
maintain that CAPS character traits are non-deterministic. Because of this, human beings 
can reinforce, diminish, or establish new CAPS during the course of their lives. So, I can 
act on the exemplification of courage that I see in Lawrence and actively try to cultivate 
such courage. Lawrence and I can discuss how he interprets situations in which he acts 
courageously. Even if he cannot describe his cognitive and affective states when he acts 
courageously, I still can have insight into them because of how they reveal themselves in 
his actions over time.
111
 Then Lawrence and I can work to develop the components of 
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 Aristotle emphasizes a similar point when he maintains that sometimes we are more aware of the 
virtuous functioning of others than of ourselves. See his arguments in NE IX, 9. For an argument against 
this position see Julia Annas’s “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism” in Mind, New Series, Vol. 
86, No. 344 (1977):532-544. 
  
 
85 
 
courage within me.
112
 The amount of time this takes will depend on factors such as my 
interpretive tendencies, my pre-existing courage, and the number of opportunities I have 
to act courageously. Given that Lawrence will also continue to develop his courage, his 
efforts will continually remind me about the non-static nature of virtues, character, and 
human flourishing. All of this is consistent with the existence of global mixed character 
traits. That is, perhaps the reason I need to further develop my “courage” is that I have 
not yet cultivated courage whereas Lawrence has. I simply have a global mixed 
character trait that consists of some of the components of courage. Given the 
compatibility of the rarity thesis with the empirical evidence, it is also possible that 
Lawrence has the virtue of courage, and that he must continue to cultivate it. In short, 
character-friendships are possible within the confines of the types of CAPS accounts we 
are considering.  
 
Character-Friendships and Moral Development in Adults: A Defense  
The fact that character-friendships are possible within the types of CAPS based accounts 
of virtues that we have considered does not entail that such an account should include 
the claim that character-friendships are well-suited to play an important role in adult 
moral development. I will now provide six arguments to support the claim that they are 
well-suited for such a role.  
                                                 
112
 I assume Lawrence would help me based on the commitment and mutual affection he would exhibit as 
my character-friend. 
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As we have seen, one of the benefits of global CAPS character traits is that they 
provide the opportunity to observe the exemplification of global character traits over a 
period of time. This is in keeping with the claim that character-friendships provide an 
opportunity for people in general and adults in particular to see concrete 
exemplifications of virtues in a close friend. Recall my relationship with Lawrence. 
When I want to think about what courage entails, I do not have to resort strictly to 
abstract thought and philosophy about the moral properties of courage. Instead, a CAPS 
account of virtues has the resources to allow me to think about how Lawrence has 
exemplified courage throughout his life. This is important for at least two reasons.  
First, because I can watch Lawrence act courageously over time, I have access to 
behavior that can provide me with a general appreciation for the motivations, beliefs, 
emotions, plans, goals, and range of actions that are consistent with courage. This type 
of appreciation typically is inaccessible when one considers the actions of a stranger, 
courageous or otherwise. Rightly determining a stranger’s motivations, for example, is a 
notoriously difficult problem. That said, I am not arguing that it is impossible to 
apprehend the motives behind a stranger’s behavior. Rather, I am arguing that the 
amount of time character-friends spend with one another better enables them to gain a 
general appreciation of the components of virtues and virtuous actions that they 
manifest.  
 Second, character-friendships also provide the opportunity for adults to gain an 
appreciation of specific examples of virtuous behavior. This is significant because moral 
philosophers often criticize virtue theorists for not providing something like a manual or 
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set of principles that guide right action. Instead of conceding this as a weakness of their 
accounts, virtue theorists typically celebrate it as one of their accounts’ strengths. They 
claim that any moral theory that primarily consists in a procedural guide is too wooden 
for the complexities of real life. Even if this is the case, I think it is important for virtue 
theorists to explain the epistemic resources their account provides for reasoning about 
virtuous behavior in a specific situation.  
 The typical response virtue theorists provide is that one should act as the virtuous 
person would act.
113
 One could easily interpret this to mean that one should think hard 
about what the virtuous person would do in this situation. Yet even if one has an 
understanding of how a virtuous person generally acts, it does not follow that one has an 
understanding of how a virtuous person would act in this specific situation.  
 Character-friendships help to address this problem, because the friends 
experience manifestations of the virtues in particular situations. That is to say, character-
friends can appeal to concrete and specific instances of virtuous behavior that they and 
their friends manifested in situations like the one in which they currently find 
themselves. Here I take behavior to include all of the social-cognitive units of which the 
virtues consist. Clearly, this access to examples of virtuous behavior does not secure 
knowledge about how exactly one should act in one’s particular situation. Perhaps that is 
to be expected, though, given the role that practical wisdom plays on many accounts of 
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 For a discussion of why this is a justification and not a criterion for an action see Glen Pettigrove “Is 
Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” in Journal of Ethics 15 (2011):191-207. 
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virtue.
114
 That said, the range of virtuous behavior that character-friends can draw from 
surely can help keep their moral deliberations from being either overly abstract or 
woodenly procedural. Thus character-friends can provide epistemic resources for 
reasoning about how to act in particular situations in the absence of a manual on 
morality.  
In addition to their role in helping adults develop a general and specific view of 
particular virtues, character-friendships provide the opportunity for adults to recognize 
their need to cultivate an underdeveloped virtue that they may have otherwise 
overlooked. For example, since marrying my wife, I have become much more aware of 
my need to cultivate empathy.
115
 I am not saying that I completely lacked empathy 
before I married her. On the contrary, my wife cites my empathetic tendencies as one of 
the reasons she wanted to marry me. Part of the reason I had these tendencies is that my 
parents taught me about empathy and exemplified aspects of it during my childhood. So 
it is not as though I simply had a natural knack for empathetic behavior.
116
 My parents 
cultivated empathy in me. Even with this training, however, I still lacked understanding 
and possession of several aspects of empathy. Yet I did not realize it. I only became 
aware of these lacks and my need to address them as I watched my wife.
117
 Thus my 
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 For examples see Adams’s A Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Annas’s 
Intelligent Virtue; Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; Talbot Brewer’s The Retrieval of Ethics; and 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue, 3rd Edition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).  
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 See EE 1240a36-9 for Aristotle’s famous discussion of this virtue. 
116
 Here I agree with virtue theorists such as Annas and Aristotle who contend that a natural ability or 
tendency is not a virtue.  
117
 Here I disagree with Jesse Prinz’s claim that “we do not alter personality by seeking to better ourselves 
or the people we care for. Rather, personality adapts in an involuntary way to life circumstances.”  As I 
observed my wife and attempted to develop aspects of virtue that I saw in her, I did in fact alter my 
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ability to witness my wife’s excellence in being empathetic has helped me combat my 
tendency to overlook my need to cultivate empathy.
118
  
A third reason character-friendships are well-suited for CAPS based accounts of 
virtue which tie virtue to human flourishing is that they provide adults with a social 
network of people who actively help one another pursue a shared vision of their 
particular goods within the context of their shared vision of human flourishing in 
general.
 119
 This is particularly important for at least two reasons. Given the prevalence 
of global mixed character traits, these social networks serve as a helpful vehicle for the 
development of global mixed character traits into virtues. Because, for example, 
Lawrence is aware that I have a global mixed character trait that has some of the 
components of the virtue courage, he will actively help me try to develop that character 
trait into courage. Given the nature of the commitment of character-friendships, he will 
continue to help me do this throughout the entirety of our friendship. This type of 
support network clearly is helpful for adults who are trying to develop mixed traits into 
virtues.  
                                                                                                                                                
personality, traits, and way of interpreting the world. While I acknowledge that there was an involuntary 
component to this, I do not think that component exhaustively accounts for the change in my trait. See 
Prinz’s “The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics” in 
Journal of Ethics 13 (2009):117-144. 
118
 There is also an important sense in which my new role as husband came with the demand that I gain a 
better understanding of empathy so that I could better relate to my wife. I am thankful to Paul Berghaus 
for pointing this out to me. 
119
 I do not mean to support fully the notion of social networks set forth by situationists like Maria Merritt. 
Although I do think they are right to emphasize the importance of social networks for the development and 
manifestation of cross-situationally consistent behavior, I think they are wrong to hold that this will not 
involve global character traits. See Merritt’s “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology” in 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2000): 365-383. 
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A second reason that these social networks are important is that the members of 
them can play an active role in combating fragmentation. Fragmentation is the tendency 
to view oneself as a number of disconnected persons with disparate goals, desires, 
beliefs, and responsibilities instead of as a unified person with a unified set of goals, 
desires, beliefs, and responsibilities.
120
 There is nothing in a CAPS account of character 
traits that excludes or stymies the formation of fragmented or extremely situation 
specific character traits. For example, the fact that CAPS character traits are capable of 
globalization does not entail that all of the character traits a person possesses are global. 
So one could have a number of highly situation specific character traits that conflict with 
several of one’s generalized character traits and serve as a catalyst for fragmentation. 
Additionally, one could possess several generalized character traits that are 
incommensurable and therefore contribute to one’s fragmentation. It is possible, for 
example, that when I am with my army unit I demonstrate immense loyalty. Yet in my 
“personal life,” I am consistently unfaithful to my wife.121  
Character-friendships provide resources for combating these two forms of 
fragmentation. My character-friends can help me reflect upon and alter my character 
traits so that I possess and act from a more unified vision of my individual capacities, 
goals, and callings. They can do this, of course, because they know me well. They will 
do this because they have committed to help me flourish. Because we share a common 
                                                 
120
 For similar arguments see Adams’s A Theory of Virtue, chapters.8, 11, and 12; Annas’s, Intelligent 
Virtue; Talbot Brewer’s The Retrieval of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapters 2 and 
7; and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. 
121
 I want to thank Major Paul Berghaus for pointing out just how prevalent this is within the US army.  
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vision of the general human good, we can also work towards ensuring that my life is 
actually intelligible within the framework of the general human good.
122
 Through this 
process we may steadily deal with my fragmented and inconsistent character-traits. 
 A fourth reason character-friendships are well-suited for CAPS based accounts 
of adult moral development is that they provide a social network in which one can 
combat static or conservative attitudes or views about the virtues. Character-friends, by 
definition, share a commitment to cultivate each others’ virtues throughout their lives. 
This commitment includes continual examination of the shared vision of the virtues and 
what they entail. Sometimes this leads both friends to extend their understanding of a 
virtue. Indeed, sometimes they will conclude that being virtuous requires that they 
significantly alter several of their beliefs and actions that are in keeping with societal 
mores.
123
  
From the perspective of a CAPS account of character-traits, we can appreciate 
the difficulty of such a change. Both friends will need to use a new interpretive grid so 
that when they experience the pertinent stimuli they will now interpret it as grounds for a 
different type of behavior. They will also need to cultivate a way of interacting with 
people who disagree with their seemingly anomalous behavior. These two facts alone 
will require a significant amount of internal reconstruction with respect to the activation 
                                                 
122 This is entailed by the reciprocal appreciation and choice involved in character-friendships. 
123
 I take it that the realist position about human goods and flourishing that I have presented does not entail 
that human beings have the epistemic ability to grasp all of the details involved with the human good. One 
could hold that human beings begin with a rather fuzzy understanding of the human good and how it 
relates to them, and that as they go through the process of moral and epistemic maturity they still only ever 
attain a partial understanding of the human good in general. Such a position is consistent with this feature 
of character-friendships. I am indebted to Talbot Brewer for making me aware of this possibility. See 
Brewer’s The Retrieval of Ethics, 236-285. 
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processes of each friend’s CAPSs. For reasons like this I take it that character-
friendships are well-suited for the arduous and necessary task adult human beings face 
when they try to extend their view and manifestation of a virtue, particularly when this 
calls for a breach from societal norms.
 124
 
A fifth and similar argument is that character-friendships are well-suited to help 
individuals combat their CAPS based vices. Because of the feedback loop nature of 
CAPS, if I have cultivated a vice over the course of several years, it will be extremely 
difficult for me to break it and replace it with a different character trait. Every time I 
perceive stimuli that have historically activated my vicious trait, I will experience a tug 
in that direction. This is particularly true of the early stages of breaking a vice. My 
character-friends should be aware of these issues. They will be familiar with when and 
why I respond from a vice. Thus they can help me when I experience the initial tug to act 
on the activation of a belief or feeling that is a part of my vice. Because we share a 
vision of who I want to be, they can encourage me in ways that combat the activation of 
my vice by activating my nascent character trait. Moreover, because they are my 
character-friends, they have committed to help me change and will act on this 
commitment. This is crucial given how recalcitrant people are when they try to change 
their deeply reinforced character traits. 
                                                 
124
 The features of character-friendships, as I have described them, do not rule out the possibility that a 
misguided friendship could reinforce one’s bad ideas and produce cultish behavior in opposition to the 
good norms of society. A moral philosophy would need more resources than I have provided to deal with 
that.  
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Finally, character-friendships are well-suited to aid in CAPS based moral 
development during the different stages of adult life. For example, I hope that my wife 
and I cultivate generosity differently ten years from now. I say this because we will need 
to reexamine what it means for us to be generous with a different income, larger family, 
or new neighbors. This probably will require that we alter the structure of our character 
traits. Whether we add beliefs, modify goals, or create new self-regulatory plans, we will 
both benefit from the assistance of the other as we develop our generosity in light of our 
common commitments and different stage of life.  
 
Character-Friendships and the Effects of Groups: An Examination  
We have seen that there are good conceptual reasons to hold that character-friendships 
are compatible with some CAPS accounts of virtue. In addition, we saw that character-
friendships are well-suited to play a role in adult moral development within CAPS based 
accounts of virtue that recognize mixed global character traits and tie virtue to human 
flourishing. Yet at this point someone may question the empirical adequacy of the claim 
that character-friendships positively contribute to adult moral development. Indeed, there 
is a large body of psychological literature on the impacts that groups have on human 
behavior, especially helping behavior. Many of the findings in this literature seem to 
suggest that groups often serve to hinder helping behavior.
125
 Let us now consider a few 
examples. 
                                                 
125
 I am indebted to Christian Miller for bringing this literature and its relevance to character-friendships to 
my attention. 
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 In their highly influential “Lady in Distress” experiment, Latané and Rodin had 
experimenters persuade their subjects that they were participating in a marketing survey. 
During the experiment researchers took the subjects to a small room where they meet a 
woman who appeared to be a marketing representative. As the subjects proceeded to fill 
out forms in that room, the representative left the room and walked into a contiguous 
office. Four minutes after her departure, 
…if they were listening carefully, [the subjects] heard her climb up on a chair 
to get a book from the top shelf. Even if they were not listening carefully they 
heard a loud crash and a woman’s scream as the chair fell over. “Oh, my God, 
my foot…” cried the representative. “I…I …can’t move…it. Oh, my ankle. 
I…can’t…can’t…get…this thing off…me.” She moaned and cried for about a 
minute longer, getting gradually more subdued and controlled.
126
  
 
Latané and Rodin made the dependent variable of their experiment whether or not the 
subject exhibited any helping behavior. This included attempts to go next door and 
check on the woman, to attempts to call out to the woman to see if she was okay. 
Furthermore, they established four different versions of the experiment. In one version, 
the subject was alone in the room. In this context, 70 percent of subjects exhibited 
helping behavior. In the second version, the subject was in the room with two friends. 
Once again, 70 percent of the subjects exhibited helping behavior. In the third version, 
the subject was in the room with two strangers. Only 40 percent of the subjects exhibited 
helping behavior in this context. In the final version, the subject was paired with a 
                                                 
126
 Latané and Darley The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? (New York: Appleton 
Century-Crofts, 1970), 58. The original report of this is experiment is in Latané and Rodin’s “A Lady In 
Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention” in Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 5 (1969):189-202. 
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confederate who ignored the crash. Only 7 percent of the subjects exhibited helping 
behavior in this context.
127
    
 If we, like Latané and Rodin, take the first version of the experiment as the 
control, then it seems rather clear that the presence of others does have a negative impact 
on a subject’s helping behavior. According to Latané and Darley, even the second 
version of the experiment, where two friends are present, is in keeping with this claim. 
....[w]hile superficially this appears as high as the Alone condition, again there 
must be a correction for the fact that two people are free to act. When compared 
to the 91 percent base rate of hypothetical person groups, friends do inhibit 
each other from intervening.
128
 
 
In other words, if we combine the likelihood that three individuals who are alone will 
help and compare that with the percentage of subjects who helped when they were with 
their friends, we find that the percentage of subjects who exhibited helping behavior in 
the presence of their friends is lower than the hypothetical number. 
 Many psychological experiments seem to confirm the findings of Latané and 
Rodin’s famous study. As Christian Miller explains,  
In examining 48 studies, Latané et al. found that, in group effect studies using 
confederates, 75% of alone subjects helped, whereas less than 53% of subjects 
in groups did. For group effect studies using groups of subjects with no 
confederates, 50% of alone subjects helped, whereas 22% of subjects in groups 
did.
129
 
 
Do these types of empirical findings subvert the idea that character-friendships can play 
an important role in adult moral development?  
                                                 
127
 Latané and Rodin, “A Lady in Distress”, 193-195, and Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive 
Bystander, 60-63. 
128
 Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 63. 
129
 Christian Miller “Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior” in 
Journal of Ethics and Social Psychology 5 (2010), 17. 
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 I want to begin my answer to this question by noting that the empirical data from 
group effects studies does not support the conclusions that groups always inhibit helping 
behavior or that all groups equally inhibit helping behavior. In one study, for example, 
subjects in a group of friends responded much more quickly to someone who appeared 
to be in an epileptic fit than subjects in a group of strangers.
130
 In a different study, 
….[s]ubjects in groups of four who had been allowed to meet and interact with 
each other for 20 minutes helped at a much higher rate than did subjects who 
were not so allowed (68.9% verses 25.8%). Indeed, highly cohesive groups of 
four helped more than did highly cohesive groups of two, thereby reversing the 
group effect.
131
 
 
In yet another study, subjects in a room arranged such that they faced each other 
responded significantly closer to subjects who were alone (80 percent to 90 percent) than 
subjects in a room that was not so arranged (~20%).
132
  All of these findings demonstrate 
that the results of group effects studies are quite mixed. These results vary greatly 
depending on the relationships between the people in the group and the number of 
people in the group.  
 Second, I think we should note that the study with the epileptic demonstrates that 
friends do not always negatively impact helping behavior. On the contrary, sometimes 
they make it significantly more likely that an individual will exhibit helping behavior. 
                                                 
130
 Latané and Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 105-106. 
131
 Miller, “Character Traits”, 18-19. 
132
 Darley et al., “Do Groups Always Inhibit Individuals’ Responses to Potential Emergencies?” in Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 26 (1973): 395-399. For more examples see Latané and Nida “Ten 
Years of Research on Group Size and Helping” in Psychological Bulletin 89 (1981), 321; Chekroun and 
Brauer “The Bystander Effect and Social Control Behavior: The Effect of the Presence of Others on 
People’s Reactions to Norm Violations” in European Journal of Social Psychology 32 (2002): 853-867; 
and Miller, “Character Traits”, 18-19.  
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That is to say, in some cases, human beings are far more likely to exhibit helping 
behavior if they are with friends than if they are with strangers.
133
  
 Third, to my knowledge, none of the experiments involved observations that 
compared how the same person acted when they were alone as compared to when they 
were with their friends. This, it seems to me, would provide us with helpful insight into 
the manner in which friends helped individuals act more or less virtuously. I believe that 
the lack of this information makes it quite difficult to gauge just how germane these 
observations are to questions about the empirical adequacy of character-friendships in 
adult moral development. 
 Fourth, none of the experiments in which subjects were with friends discuss the 
type of friendship between the subject and their friend. Recall that even Aristotle 
acknowledged that a wide range of types of friendships exist, some of which are rather 
petty.
134
 Without this information, we simply cannot draw conclusions from this date 
about whether or not character-friendships have a positive role in the moral development 
of the adults who are in them from the experimental findings. We only have warrant to 
claim that the empirical data about the impact of friends on helping behavior is mixed, 
and that we need more information to ascertain how character-friends aid or impede one 
another’s manifestation of virtues within situations where such a manifestation is 
appropriate.   
                                                 
133
 For more on the empirical findings regarding the impact of friends on helping behavior, see Latané and 
Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander, 105-106; and Latané and Robin, “A Lady in Distress”, 200-201. 
134
 Recall, for example, Aristotle’s discussion of people who are friends simply because they are useful for 
one another. See NE 1156a7, 1157b1. 
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 Finally, we would need to say much more about what we can learn about the 
moral development of a human being based off of one action that that individual 
performs. I for one do not believe we can determine the success of character-friends in 
adult moral development without information about how an individual in question 
behaved prior to the individual’s participation in a character-friendship. Furthermore, I 
think we could learn even more about this if we could take those groups that failed to 
exhibit helping behavior and place them in another situation where such behavior was 
appropriate. This could begin to help us understand the impact that character-friendships, 
assuming that these individuals are in such a relationship, have on adults. Of course, it 
would also help to see how the character-friends of an individual who failed to exhibit 
helping behavior when the individual was alone could impact that individual’s behavior 
the next time they were in a similar situation. The data as it currently exists 
unfortunately does not address these types of situations and questions. Indeed, the results 
of group effect studies are mixed and incomplete.   
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that character-friendships are both possible and well-suited within a CAPS 
based account of virtue that recognizes that global mixed traits exist and ties virtue to 
human flourishing. In addition, I have maintained that character-friendships are well-
suited to play an important role in adult moral development within such an account. In 
so doing, I have emphasized the importance of social networks for the development and 
manifestation of consistent virtuous behavior in adults. Indeed, social networks that 
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consist of character-friends are important for moral development in adults because, as 
human beings, they are social creatures. Any account of virtue that ties virtues to human 
flourishing must address this point. As I see it, the features of CAPS based accounts of 
virtue and character-friendships are well-suited for jointly providing such an account. 
Finally, I also maintained that the results from group effects studies are too mixed and 
incomplete for them to establish the empirical adequacy of character-friendships. We 
could surely enrich CAPS based accounts of virtue if we had such findings. This, 
therefore, is one way that CAPS based virtue theorists could extend their account. In the 
next and final chapter, I will propose several other such courses. Let us now turn to that 
endeavor. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to extend contemporary CAPS based accounts 
of virtue in three primary ways. First, I argued for the empirical adequacy of some CAPS 
based accounts of virtue. Second, I set forth the community and tradition based model of 
human moral development as a model that is compatible with and well-suited for pre-
adult human moral development within such accounts. Third, I contended that character-
friendships between adult human beings are compatible with and well-suited to play a 
significant role in adult human moral development from the perspective and resources of 
the previous model and a CAPS understanding of virtues. Yet even if my arguments for 
these positions are sound, I believe I and other virtue theorists have much more work to 
do before we have provided an empirically and developmentally adequate account of 
virtue. I will now spend the remainder of this chapter outlining issues that CAPS based 
virtue theorists need to address. 
  The vast majority of my attempts to extend CAPS based accounts of virtue have 
involved arguments that concern the compatibility between a particular thesis and 
various results from empirical psychological studies. While this is an important first step 
in the process of establishing that some CAPS based accounts of virtue are empirically 
viable, it is not the strongest relationship that such accounts can have to empirical 
evidence. Within the philosophy of science, for example, scientists and philosophers 
usually agree that there are four different types of positive relationships with which a 
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theory can have with empirical evidence, each of which respectively is more difficult to 
establish than the other.
135
 First, a theory can be logically compatible with the evidence.  
Second, a theory can entail the evidence. Third, a theory can explain the evidence. 
Fourth, a theory can be empirically supported by the evidence. In the last case a theory 
has the ability to make surprising or unexpected predictions. I believe it is accurate to 
say that in the majority of my arguments I have tried to establish the first positive 
relationship between some CAPS based accounts of virtue and the available empirical 
evidence. Of course, some of my arguments, particularly those about the existence of 
CAPS and mixed traits, have sought to establish the second, third, and fourth positive 
relationship between some of my account and the empirical evidence. 
 In light of this, I believe that one of the tasks virtue theorists who subscribe to 
CAPS need to undertake is that of establishing all four relationships between the 
empirical evidence and a CAPS based account of virtue. By empirical evidence, I am 
thinking about evidence from a wide number of fields including biology, psychology, 
sociology, history, and theology.
136
 For reasons that I still do not know or understand, 
many accounts of virtue completely ignore evidence from these fields. Indeed, even 
though CAPS theorists do pay attention to some psychological findings, they often 
completely ignore empirical evidence from the other fields. Here I am thinking in 
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 Here I am borrowing from Larry Laudan’s helpful discussion of this in “Demystifying 
Underdetermination” in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, ed. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover 
(London: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998): 320-353.  
136
 I take it that the most surprising member of this list is theology. I have included this field because of the 
long histories in the East and West of the thoughtful and empirically informed accounts of virtue that have 
come from religious communities and thinkers. I believe that virtue theorists should not ignore evidence 
from these sources.  
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particular of how virtue theorists neglect the findings of biological science. For example, 
I am still unaware of a single virtue theorist who has responded to or even taken into 
account Philip Kitcher’s critique of human essence based accounts of virtue based on 
recent findings in developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and genetics.
137
 Until 
virtue theorists propose an account of virtue that addresses empirical evidence like that 
offered by Kitcher, they will not provide a fully satisfactory account of virtue. 
 At this point someone may respond to my call for interdisciplinary work by 
arguing that the scope of this work is simply so broad that it is infeasible. Perhaps that is 
true. Even if it is, however, that does not refute the claim that such work is what a fully 
satisfactory account of virtue requires. Note that I have not up to this point argued that 
such an account is achievable. I honestly doubt that it is. Still, if virtue theorists want to 
provide an empirically adequate account, then they must address all of the relevant 
empirical evidence in at least the fields I have mentioned. Furthermore, they should 
strive to do more than establish the consistency of their account with that evidence. They 
should try to establish all four positive relationships between their account and the 
relevant evidence.
138
 
 In addition to the immense challenges virtue theorists face concerning 
interdisciplinary work, they also face immense internal challenges. There are numerous 
internal debates that virtue theorists still have a long way to go before they resolve them. 
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 Philip Kitcher, “Essence and Perfection” in Ethics, 110, (1999):59-83. 
138
  In the last chapter we saw that one of the empirical and interdisciplinary tasks that virtue theorists need 
to undertake is the performance of longitudinal studies that would reveal more about issues in moral 
development in pre-adults and adults. 
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These include but are not limited to what counts as a virtue, the rarity of the virtues, the 
unity of the virtues, the universability of the development of virtues, and how exactly it 
is that human beings acquire virtues. These debates often involve a number of sub issues 
that virtue theorists have not yet addressed. When it comes to what counts as a virtue, for 
example, virtue theorists need to address several questions about the relationship 
between the virtues of various traditions and cultures and those things which truly are 
virtues. Robert Adams, for instance, attempts to distinguish between cultural “virtues’ 
and the universal or cardinal “Virtues.”139  Adams makes this distinction based on 
virtues that he believes stand in a particular relationship with God (Virtues) with those 
which do not but are still worthy of the title ‘virtue.’ Clearly many virtue theorists do 
reject this sort of an account of which “virtues’ within a culture are actually virtues. Yet 
to my knowledge, Adams is one of the only virtue theorists to even attempt to offer a 
possible theory for how to determine which virtues in a society are actually virtues. 
Indeed, many virtue theorists seem to assume that all people hold to more or less the 
same view of what counts as a virtue. This is clearly false. Indeed, we saw this in chapter 
three.  
 I will conclude this chapter by proposing one other issue that virtue theorists 
need to address in order to extend CAPS based accounts of virtue. Virtue theorists need 
to do more to think about the holistic nature of the features of these accounts. That is to 
say, they need to do more to address how all of the features of these accounts relate. 
                                                 
139
 See chapter 11 of Adams’s A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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Consider, for example, my remarks throughout this paper regarding the historical nature 
of human moral development. In just what sense do one’s experiences as an infant 
impact how one interprets the worlds when they are a sixty-five year old adult? While 
this question may initially sound absurd, I want to point out that there is nothing within a 
CAPS account of character traits to establish that it is. On the contrary, it seems that the 
features of that account should require us to take this question seriously. Indeed, 
scientists and philosophers of science have begun to ask similar questions about the 
relationships between genes, organisms, natural selection, environments, and the human 
development. As I understand it, many of the answers that they are proposing involve an 
extremely holistic approach where they take all of these factors into consideration. It 
seems to me that virtue theorists probably will need to give similar types of answers. 
Once again, I realize this poses significant challenges. My hope is that virtue theorists, of 
all people, will have acquired and developed the patience required to work on these 
extremely important and multifaceted issues. 
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